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Nicholson: The Legal Standing of the South's School Resistance Proposals

THE LEGAL STANDING OF THE SOUTH'S
SCHOOL RESISTANCE PROPOSALS
FRANCIS B. NICHOLSON*

On May 17, 1954, the Supreme Court of the United States
announced its decision of the most momentous issue to come
before the Court in recent years. At stake was the constitutionality of segregation of the races in the public schools.
1
By its unanimous ruling in Broum v. Board of Education,
and its four companion cases, that segregation per se was an
unconstitutional denial of the equal protection of the laws
to Negro school pupils, the Court thus disposed of the crucial
issue which had hovered in the background of so many cases
of recent years dealing with racial discrimination.
On the one hand, a decision upholding the states' power to
require segregation of the races would undoubtedly have deterred for many years the efforts of Negro leaders to eliminate the practice and policy of racial separation. On the
other hand, the Court's agreement that "separate but equal"
was not enough and that segregation itself was invalid, upset
the policy of separation of the races required by law in seventeen states and the District of Columbia, and permitted in four
other states. 2 Fifteen of these states had provisions in their
state constitutions requiring separation in the schools. 3
While some of the few states outside of the South which
permitted segregation were already moving to abolish the
practice, 4 the established separation in the schools has been
the keystone and supporting arch of the South's racial segre*LL.B., U. S. C., 1952; LL.M., George Washington University, 1954.
Instructor, Stetson University, College of Law, St. Petersburg, Fla. This
paper adapted from thesis submitted for LL.M. degree.
1. - U.S. -, 98 L. ed. 583. The Brown case originated in Kansas.
The other cases and the states in which they arose were: Briggs v.
Elliott, South Carolina; Davis v. County School Board, Virginia; Bolling
v. Sharpe, District of Columbia; Gebhart v. Belton, Delaware.
2. MuRRAY, STATE'S LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR 14 (1950). See also
N. Y. Times, May 18, 1954, p. 18.
3. Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.
4. Several New Mexico cities abolished segregation in their schools
during 1952 and 1953, refuting their previous segregated operation under
New Mexico's statute permitting this practice. N. Y. TIMES, August 24,
1952, p. 64, col. 3; id., Feb. 15, 1953, p. 34, col. 1. Phoenix, Arizona, took
similar action after a local court declared segregation to be unlawful
despite Arizona's permissive statute. N. Y. TimEs, Feb. 15, 1953, p. 34,
col. 1; id. July 16, 1953, p. 15, col. 7. Topeka, Kansas, whose segregated
system was attacked in Brown v. Board of Education, also moved to
integrate its schools. Id., Sept. 5, 1953, p. 13, col. 5.
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gation. The decision declaring this practice to be henceforth
invalid was expected to be a stunning blow to the structure
upon which the social order of the South has for long been
based.5
PREPAREDNESS MEASURES

Anticipating a decision adverse to segregation and fearing
its unpredictable impact, Southern leaders of those states in
which the decision would have its most real consequences
early announced their intention to undertake any possible or
feasible measures to insure the continuance of separate schools
for the races, despite the Court's ruling. Governor James F.
Byrnes of South Carolina declared in March 1951, while the
case involving that state's segregation laws was still before the
trial court:
Should the Supreme Court decide this case against our
position, we will face a serious problem. Of only one
thing can we be certain. South Carolina will not now
nor for some years to come, mix white and colored children in our school.... If the Court changes what is now
the law of the land, we will, if it is possible, live within
the law, preserve the public school system, and at the
same time maintain segregation. If that is not possible,
reluctantly we will abandon the public school system. To
do that would be choosing the lesser of two great evils. 6
echoed these sentiGovernor Herman Talmadge of Georgia
7
ments in repeated pronouncements.
It was generally agreed throughout the South that white
Southerners, while proud of the progress which had been
made in Negro education and determined to continue that
5. A Southern newspaper editor reported: "If the Court forbids all
segregation in public education, the consequences will be tremendous,
though unpredictable." Dabney, Southern Crisis: The Segregation Decision, THE SATURDAY EVENING POST, Nov. 8, 1952, at p. 104. Another
commentator added: "The political and sociological pressures surrounding the whole question are intense.... many Southerners maintain that
a decision barring segregation would upset the whole fabric of society
....

" N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1953, p. 1, col. 4.

6. Address before the South Carolina Education Association, March
16, 1951, THE STATE (Columbia, S. C.), March 17, 1951, p. 1, col. 8.
In a subsequent interview, Governor Byrnes commented: "It is my belief that a Supreme Court ruling outlawing segregated public schools
could have an emotional impact in certain areas of South Carolina and
result in trouble. I therefore consider it sound governmental policy at
this time to evolve a plan of action in advance in order to counteract
any future hysteria." N. Y. TIMEs, May 28, 1951, p. 16, col. 4.
7. N. Y. TImEs, June 6, 1950, p. 19, col. 2; id., June 14, 1952, p. 34,
col. 7.
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progress, 8 were not yet ready to merge the races throughout
their public schools. Consequently, Southern legislators, resolved to avoid such a merger, began both public and private
consideration of self-styled "preparedness measures"" designed to make it possible for their states to continue separate schools in the event their segregation laws were declared
invalid. The tempo of the consideration of such measures increased following the Court's decision and by this time all of
the Southern states most directly affected by the decision, because of the proportion of Negroes present in each, have outlined their plans for the attempt to sidestep the invalidation
of their segregation mandates.
But just as the leaders of the white populace of these states
are determined to retain separate schools, so the Negro leaders spear-heading the attack on segregation are resolved,
with equal determination) to fight every such attempt to sidestep the decision. These leaders speak of such plans as have
been developed as sham and subterfuge and have avowed their
intention to meet the institution of any or all of such plans
10
with immediate court action.
With the stage thus set-the white South poised to begin
evasive action and the Negro leaders equally poised to upset
such action-thoughtful Southerners, concerned that their always touchy racial problems should be beset with such direct
conflict, are pondering the future. They are, of course, deeply
8. For a general review of this progress, see N. Y. TIMES, March 16,

1952, p. 82, col. 4. Dr. Benjamin Fine, education editor of the TIMES,

termed the progress "remarkable" and "phenomenal." However, his
optimistic report was rebutted and criticized as "misleading" by C. H.
Thompson, editor of THE JOURNAL or NEGRO EDUCATION. N. Y. TIMES,
April 6, 1952, IV, p. 8, col. 5. In South Carolina, the chairman of the
state's Educational Finance Commission, set up to run the school equali-

zation program, could report, after three years, that South Carolina's
school progress had been a "thrilling story." Since 1951, the official
stated, the state had allotted 96-million dollars for school construction
and was allotting, in 1954, three million per month. Two-thirds of all
the building funds were reported to have been spent on Negro schools.
GREENVILLE NEws (Greenville, S. C.), May 12, 1954, p. 5, col. 6-7.

9. Governor Byrnes, Address before the South Carolina Association
of School Boards, October 16, 1952, THE STATE, October 17, 1952, p. 1,

col. 4.
10. Walter White, executive secretary of the Association for the Advancement of Colored People, told a meeting of the Association's leaders
in January of 1954: "Just as we have carried the fight against openly
avowed segregation to the highest court in the land, so shall we fight
any subtle forms of segregation or any attempts to evade a possible
decision of the court . . . ." N. Y. TIDIES, Jan. 5, 1954, p. 25, col. 5. A
local N.A.A.C.P. official in South Carolina earlier called for a $10,000
fund "to slap the school cases back into court at once" if the state attempts to evade the Court's decision. THE STATE, Nov. 3, 1952, p. 1,
col. 5.
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disturbed over the possible effect of the eventual abolition of
the keystone of racial segregation-separation in the schools.
They are more immediately concerned, however, with the effect and future of the steps which will be undertaken to circumvent the invalidation of the segregation laws.
Those Southerners more passionately devoted to maintaining separation, remembering the results of their similar attempts to sidestep the Court's decision opening the "white primaries" to Negroes, are naturally questioning the effectiveness
of the circumvention measures which have been proposed, and
the ability of such measures to withstand attacks on their
legality and constitutionality. Others, perhaps not as fearful
of the immediate results of the removal of the segregation
laws, are concerned more with the impact of the circumvention measures themselves, and of the effect of such measures
upon the lives of the people of the South and upon the area's
established educational systems.
Still other, more rational Southerners, feeling that the removal of the segregation mandates will not result in any serious surge of Negro children to white schools, are questioning
the advisability of proceeding with the varied evasive steps.
They fear that such steps will aggravate the already ruffled
tempers of the racial protagonists and produce unnecessary
strife and bitter feeling. Those who have expressed such opinions feel that the tension produced by the Court's decision
could best be alleviated through racial cooperation and common sense compromise. They do not feel that the probability
of success of the circumvention measures is sufficient to warrant the conflict and increased agitation which they will produce.
For these reasons it is only logical that the proposed measures, calculated as they are to resist a decision of the Supreme Court, should be analyzed and then examined in the
light of the imminent attacks which they will encounter and
the theories upon which such attacks will be based.
In undertaking this study, the author, a native Southerner,
has had in mind what are considered apt words of advice
directed to the South in its present time of crisis:
.. . we should try above all to keep clearly in mind
the probable consequences of our decisions. If we do this,
what will happen? If we do that, what will happen? And
after that, what else is likely to happen? It takes straight
thinking to foresee the logical consequences of some ac-
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tion which one is tempted to take in the heat of the mo11
ment.
By probing into the "standing in court" of the various circumvention proposals, the author has earnestly endeavored
to make a contribution to the very serious business of determining what measures should be undertaken.
ANALYSIS OF BASIC PLANS

The threat to the South's segregated school systems, which
began in 1950 with a barrage of suits against the color line
in education, prompted the quick formation of what one report termed "resistance movements" 12 to preserve the region's
traditional bi-racial system. As early as 1951 the legislatures
of Florida and Georgia hastily improvised measures to prevent any sudden commingling of the races in the event cases
against their state schools should result in an adverse decision.' 3 And in the same year, 1951, South Carolina created
its committee to study means by which separation of the races
4
could be continued despite such a decision.'
Those Southern states who entered into the "resistance
movements" have, by this time, removed or laid the basis for
removing all obstacles to the implementation of planned circumvention measures. A quick account of the action which
has been taken in each state will show the plans which each
has studied and has ready for use.
Georgia: Under the leadership of Governor Herman Talmadge, who has been outspoken in his resolve to maintain
11. Johnson, The Impending Crisis of the South, NEw SOUTH, May,
1953, p. 5.
12. N. Y. TIMES, June 11, 1950, IV, p. 9, col. 1.
13. Because Negroes had filed suits seeking admission to white educational institutions of both states, the legislatures of Florida and
Georgia included in the states' appropriation bills for 1951 a proviso
that should any court order the admission of a Negro to any statesupported school or should any such school disregard the mandate of
the two states requiring separate schools, the state funds allotted to such
institution should be immediately cut off. The Florida provision to
this effect was vetoed by the state's governor. Letter of Florida Attorney General Richard W. Ervin to the author, of date March 22, 1954.
However, the similar Georgia provision was signed into law by Governor Talmadge. Ga. Laws 1951, No. 218, p. 421, et. seq. Fortunately
for Georgia's educational system, the school suits in question are still
pending and thus the provision did not have to be utilized during the
year in which it was in force. Such a provision has not been included
in appropriation bills of later years.
14. N. Y. TIMES, May 28, 1951, p. 16, col. 3.
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separation,' Georgia has devised, as its central evasive measure, a private school plan based on the grant by the state of
tuition funds to individual white children. The state's General
Assembly has proposed the following constitutional amendment as an addition to the existing public school provision,
Article VIII of the Constitution of Georgia:
Section XIII, Paragraph I, Grants for Education: Notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution, the
General Assembly may by law provide for grants of State,
county or municipal funds to citizens of the State for educational purposes, in discharge of all obligation of the
State to provide adequate education for its citizens. 16
This proposed amendment will be voted on by the people of
Georgia in November of 1954.l6a While this is the only definite
proposal which Georgia's legislators have yet passed, other
of the circumvention plans have been studied by her planners
and will undoubtedly be further considered.
Louisiana: This state's leaders did not hesitate, following
the Court's ruling, to indicate their resolve to continue separate schools. With Louisiana's legislature in session during the
summer of 1954, proposals were immediately forthcoming as
to methods of countering the adverse ruling, and the state's
legislators enacted, early in July, three such proposals.
Of two statutes, one is an individual assignment measure,
similar to that passed earlier in Mississippi, giving school
superintendents power to make an individual assignment of
each child to the school which the pupil should attend.1 7 The
other statute simply requires that separate public elementary
and secondary schools should be operated for the two races,
and is expressly specified to be in an exercise of the " . ..
State police power to promote and protect public health,
15. See N. Y. TiAIES, June 6, 1950, p. 19, col. 2; id., June 14, 1952,

p. 34, col. 7. As late as January of 1954, Governor Talmadge, while
noting that he would "hate for the necessity to arise for extreme action," declared that he would ". . . use every resource, including the
militia and the state police if necessary, to maintain segregation in
Georgia's schools." N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1954, p. 28, col. 8.
16. Ga. Laws, E.S. Nov.-Dec. 1953, No. 156, p. 241.

16a. According to unofficial returns from 1,461 precincts out of 1,903,
this amendment passed by a vote of 185,809 to 165, 848. The heavy vote
against the amendment stemmed from the activity of "a hastily organized state-wide 'Committee to Save Our Schools'. They argued that the
amendment would not preserve segregation and ultimately would destroy
the Georgia School system." N. Y. TIMEs, Nov. 4, 1954, p. 32, col. 1.

17. Act No. 556, Louisiana Laws 1954.
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morals, better education and the peace and good order in the
State and not because of race."18 This statute concludes by
providing that any school disregarding the provisions of the
act should be refused both recognition or approval and aid in
the form of state funds.
In addition to the two statutes, Louisiana's legislators further proposed a constitutional amendment which would add
the following to the state's constitutional provision that the
races should be separated in public elementary and secondary schools:
.. . This provision (for separate schools) is made in
the exercise of the state police power to promote and protect public health, morals, better education and the peace
and good order in the State, and not because of race. The
Legislature shall enact laws to enforce the state police
power in this regard.' 9
The proposed amendment would further add a provision empowering the Legislature to authorize special elections for consideration of future amendments to Article XII, the education
section of the state constitution, thus ensuring speedy action
on any further constitutional changes which may be deemed
necessary. This amendment will be submitted to the state's
voters in November of 1954.19a

Mississippi: Not being directly concerned with the school
cases, since none of them were directed at Mississippi schools,
the state's legislators declined, late in 1953, to pass a proposed
constitutional amendment designed to allow a shift from state18. Act No. 555, Louisiana Laws 1954. This police power enactment

is prefaced with the following preamble:

Whereas the exercise of the State police power shall never be
of Louisiana, and as reserved in the Tenth Amendment to the United
abridged as provided in Section 18 of Article XIX of the Constitution

States Constitution; and
Whereas, in the exercise of said State police power, laws have
been enacted throughout the history of the State requiring the
maintenance of separate schools for the education of white and
colored children, in the collective wisdom and experience of all its
people, regardless of race, to promote the health, peace, morals,
better education, and good order of the people and such separate
schools are required not on the basis of race but for the advance-

ment, protection and better education of all children of school age
in Louisiana regardless of race, and the enforcement of the State
police power requiring separate schools because of these serious

considerations is of the utmost importance to all of the people of

Louisiana, regardless of -race. (Emphasis supplied.)
19. Act No. 752, Louisiana Laws 1954.

19a. The Louisiana amendment was adopted by a vote of about 5 to 1.

N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1954, p. 32, col. 1.
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supported schools to private school systems.2 0 The state's
leaders reaffirmed their intention to maintain separate
schools, 21 however, and did proceed to enact, before the Supreme Court's decision was rendered, a measure known as the
individual assignment plan, under which local school officials
would be empowered to assign each child to the school which
that child should attend. 22 And shortly after the Court's decision, the constitutional amendment proposal was again before the state's lawmakers. The Mississippi Legal, Educational Advisory Committee, specially created to study such
measures, recommended in July, 1954, that the following provisions be added to the state's constitution:
Section 213-B. (a) Regardless of any provisions of
Article 8 (that the state should maintain public schools),
or any other provisions of this Constitution to the contrary, the Legislature shall be and is hereby authorized
and empowered by a two-thirds (2/3rds) vote of those
present and voting in each House, to abolish, and may
authorize the counties and school districts to abolish, the
public schools in this State and enact suitable legislation
to effect the same.
(b) In the event the Legislature shall abolish, or authorize the abolition of, the public schools in this State,
then the Legislature shall be and is hereby authorized
and empowered to enact suitable legislation to dispose of
school buildings, land and other school property by lease,

sale or otherwise.
20. Under the terms of the proposed amendment, the state legislature

would have been empowered, after deletion of the public school guaranty
in the state's constitution to abolish the public school system, dispose
of school property, and both appropriate state funds and authorize
counties and cities to so appropriate funds to aid educable children
to attend private schools. CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), Dec. 6,
1953, p. 16, col. 2. The Mississippi House of Representatives passed the
resolution proposing this amendment by a barely sufficient two-thirds
vote (92 to 43). Id., Dec. 11, 1953, p. 1, col. 8. When the measure reached
the Senate, however its opponents were successful in rejecting it by a
20 to 20 tie vote. Ia., Dec. 16, 1953, p. 1, col. 1; N. Y. TIMEs, Dec. 20,
1953, p. 46, col. 5. Opposition to this measure in the Mississippi House
and Senate generally centered around the argument that it was premature. CLARION-LEDrER (Jackson, Miss.), Dec. 16, 1953, p. 1, col. 1.
The arguments were also advanced that it posed a threat to the state's
educational system and that the scheme embodied in the amendment
was impractical and would probably be held unconstitutional. Id., Dec.
9, 1953, p. 1, col. 8, and Dec. 16, 1953, p. 1, col. 1.
21. The Mississippi House adopted a resolution in January, 1954,
vowing to "resist by all lawful means" any attempt to abolish separation in the schools. N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1954, p. 28, col. 8.
22. House Bill No. 45, Laws of Mississippi of 1954.
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(c) The Legislature may appropriate state funds and
authorize counties, municipalities and other governmental
subdivisions and districts to appropriate funds, including
poll tax and sixteenth section funds, to aid educable children of this State to secure an education.
(d) The Legislature may do any and all acts and things
necessary for the purposes of this section, and this section is declared to be, and is, supplemental to all other
provisions of this Constitution, and legislation enacted
under authority hereof shall3 prevail, whether in conflict
2
with other sections or not.
Mississippi has thus outlined two possible circumvention
plans,.either or both of which may be undertaken by the state
if such action is deemed necessary.
South Carolina: In January, 1952, South Carolina's Governor Byrnes recommended to the state's legislature the proposal of a constitutional amendment deleting from the state's
constitution the mandate that the state should provide free
public schools. The legislature complied with this request and
in November of the same year the people of the state gave
the amendment their stamp of approval by a vote of almost
two-to-one. The required second passage of this far-reaching
step by the state's General Assembly was delayed pending the
decision of the school cases before the Supreme Court, but in
March of 1954 the final approving resolution was passed by
24
the South Carolina House of Representatives.
Thus South Carolina completely eliminated from its constitution any mention of public schooling as an obligation on the
part of the state, and left its lawmakers free to shift to private schools if such a plan should be deemed feasible. No definite plan of action has yet been set forth, but most of the
various circumvention plans have been mentioned by South
Carolina political figures as possible courses of action, including the individual assignment plan, the individual tuition
scheme of the private school plans, and the tri-school plan
23. It was expected that Mississippi's legislature would consider this

amendment in a special session inthe early fall of 1954. This would

enable a vote on the proposal by the state's people in the general election

of this year.
24. THE STATE (Columbia, S. C.), March 18, 1954, p. 1, col. 6. South

Carolina thus erased from its Constitution the following provision,
formerly Section 5 of Article XI: "The General Assembly shall provide

for a liberal system of free public schools for all children between the
ages of six and twenty-one years, and for the division of the Counties

into suitable school districts."
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under which the state would maintain a central integrated
school in addition to the present tvo separate schools.2 5 The
special study committee created by Governor Byrnes three
years ago sat throughout the summer of 1954 and will undoubtedly have its recommendations ready for the legislative
session of 1955, if a special session is not called before that
date.
These are the only Southern states to thus far undertake
any steps toward evading the full effect of the segregation
decision. Most of the area's border states which had constitutional or statutory mandates requiring segregation are apparently either going to attempt an integration of their separate school systems or are adopting a "wait and see" attitude
until they become directly concerned by virtue of suits against
their own school systems.
From this consideration of the action within the states of
the deep South, there appear certain basic proposals which
have been considered, either alike or in varying versions, in
all of those states well advanced in designing circumvention
measures. These measures, which may be taken as the basic
plans for attempts to continue separate schools, can be outlined in the following manner.

(1) TRANSITION TO A SYSTEM OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS, WITH OR
WITHOUT DIRECT OR INDIRECT STATE SUPPORT
As a preliminary preparedness step, both in time and legal
logic, for the shift to private schools, the states must first
eliminate or amend the provisions of their state constitutions
which guarantee the maintenance by the state of a system
of free public schools.
South Carolina, as noted, has completely executed this preliminary step and the Mississippi proposal will likewise allow
that state's legislature to entirely erase public schooling as
an obligation of the state. However, the less drastic Georgia
amendment will simply add a provision to that state's public
school guaranty to the effect that the state may satisfy its
obligation by making grants to individuals to use for the
purpose of schooling.
25. Both the tri-school plan and the proposal to provide state funds

to individual children for use as tuition were advocated by office-seekers
during South Carolina's 1954 Democratic primary race. THE STATE
(Columbia, S. C.), April 15, 1954, p. 8-A, col. 6; id., May 18, 1954, p.
10-A, col. 2.
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All such measures are designed to leave the state and its
subdivisions free to withdraw from the field of public schooling. However, the action of a state in removing or amending
its constitutional provision for the maintenance of a school
system does not necessarily commit the state to so withdrawing from the field of education. If a shift to a private school
plan is not considered feasible, then the state's lawmakers
can continue its present public school system without interruption.
A consideration of the preparedness measures designed to
allow the states to shift their schools to private groups does
not produce a definitive outline as to how the transition would
be made or the private schools organized and conducted. However, the action already taken or proposed and comments on
such proposals afford an indication as to how such items as
school buildings and property and financial support would be
managed.
Buildings: The present school buildings and property,
owned by local school districts, counties or municipalities,
would be either given, leased or sold to private groups incorporated for the express purpose of conducting elementary and
secondary schools.2 6

It would be desirable, from the stand-

point of legal theory, that the property be leased or sold to the
private groups at its full marketable sale or rental value.
However, it seems doubtful that sufficient funds can be initially secured to work such an arrangement in all instances,
and it is probable that many of the school properties would
27
have to be leased or sold for nominal sums only.

FinancialSupport: In both of the states in which definitive
private school plans have been advanced, the device of grants
26. For example, the original proposal of a constitutional amendment
in Georgia, made in 1951, included the following provision: "In so providing (for individual grants to individual persons for educational purposes), the General Assembly may provide for the delivery over of any
property now owned by the state or any institution or agency of the
state or any county of the state to private individuals to be used for
educational purposes."

N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1951, p. 27, col. 6.

And

in the debate on the proposed Mississippi amendment, an advocate of
the private school plan urged that the state could sell its school properties to private corporations formed for the purpose of conducting
schools. CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), Dec. 9, 1953, p. 1, col. 8.
27. The transfer of the school properties to private groups would apparently be facilitated by existing statutory provisions under which
school district trustees and/or county boards of education are authorized to sell school buildings and property when such are no longer
used by the district. Examples are: ALA. CODE tit. 52, § 99 (1940) ; GA.
CODE ANN. (1952 Revision), § 32-909; S. C. CODE OF LAWS, 1952, §
21-238 and 21-629.1.
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by the state to individual children forms the crux of the
plans, 28 and apparently will be the prevailing strategy for
support of the private schools. Under this device, the present
cost of the public schools of each local area could be divided
by the number of school children in the area, and the resulting common sum would be provided each child for the payment of his or her tuition fees to the private schools. Thus,
the tuition charged by the private schools of each local area
would equal the present cost of the operation and maintenance
of the public schools of the area.
The provision of the sums making up these tuition grants
could apparently be divided between the state and local governments upon the same basis as the present financial structure of the free public schools. 29 Thus, while the state governments would continue to bear the larger portion of school
expenses, 30 the continuation of the division of responsibility
for financing between the state and the locality would enable
a like continuation of the present tax structures from which
31
the school expenses are derived.

In addition to the foregoing scheme of providing individual
grants for tuition purposes, the states could, of course, support
the private schools by outright and continuing subsidies, or
could render services, such as transportation of children and
provision of textbooks. On the other extreme, there is the
possibility of attempting to have the private schools financed
solely through private means, such as tuition and contributions, with no aid, either direct or indirect, from state or local
governments. While this drastic step of removing completely
all vestiges of governmental aid will remain a possibility, it
must be noted that at no time during the formulation of the
28. Both the Georgia and Mississippi amendments are centered on
this device. See text supported by notes 20 and 27, supra.
29. Again, both the Georgia and Mississippi proposals would allow
units of local government to make these tuition payments.
30. A table prepared by the Research Division of the National Education Association shows that, in 1952-53, the percentage of school expenditures attributable to the state governments of the Southern states
ranged from a high of 83 per cent in Alabama to a low of 54.6 per cent
in Mississippi. THE BOOK OF THE STATES 1954-55, p. 245. These percentages contrast sharply with the national average of 44.6 per cent.
Id., p. 239.
31. One of the more desirable features of the payment of state aid,
or subsidies, to local school districts has been the alleviation of the
burdensome nature of local property taxes, the basic and original source
of school funds. State subsidies derived from state sales taxes, income
taxes, etc., have generally been acknowledged to be a more effective
method of taking care of a large portion of the school costs. THE BooK
OF THE STATES

1954-55, p. 240.
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private school plans has it been proposed that such a step be
taken. The immense cost of the operation and maintenance
of adequate schools virtually necessitates support of the schools
by taxation on both local and state levels, and the private
school planners have apparently accepted this as obvious. Their
principal device, as noted, calls for the continuation of state
aid by the indirect method of providing grants to individual
children.
It has also been suggested that such state subsidy of the
private schools could be disguised in the form of state payments for "public services" rendered by the private schools,
such as adult education programs, aid to handicapped children, and programs of specialized vocational training. The
payments by the state for such services and programs could
perhaps be based upon an enhanced valuation of the worth of
the services, and thus the excess of such payments over the
costs of the services rendered would go toward operating expenses of the private schools.
Still further means by which the states will possibly attempt to aid the operation of the private schools are the provision of tax exemption and the power of eminent domain.
Internal Organization and Management: The private corporations which would be set up to take over the conduct of
elementary and secondary schools would not only use the same
buildings and be financed basically by the same taxes, but
would also be internally organized in the same fashion as the
present school districts or governing units. Apparently each
present school district would be incorporated as a private corporation, whose board of directors would supplant the present
school boards and whose managing executives, such as superintendents, could be continued in the same positions with only
slight changes in titles. Thus the same territorial limits and
managing personnel of the present school districts could be
utilized under the private school systems.
All these factors of similarity between the present public
school systems and the proposed private school plans caused
one commentator to exclaim that the private school proposals
called for only a "paper changeover". 32 Such, in fact, may be
the case.
Supervision of Standards and Attendance: While the formulators of the private school plans appear to have developed
32. N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1953, p. 19, col. 3.
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possible schemes by which the only radical changes in the
structure of the schools will be made on paper, they do not
seem to have given adequate consideration to the problems
inherent in supervision. For example, will there be any statewide standards to which the private corporations must adhere in regard to such factors as teachers' qualifications, curriculum, and course content? If so, who will set such standards and supervise adherence thereto, an agency of the state
government or an agency voluntarily formed by the private
groups?
More vitally, since the state and its subdivisions will be
giving each child a sum which he will supposedly use to pay
his school tuition, who will see to it that each child does use
the money for that purpose? This apparent difficulty may
be eased by giving, instead of outright grants, "orders" on
the state to pay so much for private school tuition, which the
state would honor when presented by a private school. However, the danger of loose management of these funds remains.
Moreover, will the state attempt to continue enforcement of
its compulsory school attendance law, on the established premise that the required attendance need not be at a free public
school,3 3 or will it leave all attendance requirements to the
private schools ?34
Such questions pose perplexing problems. It is possible that
the private school planners will not attempt any supervisory
requirements whatever, because of the evident desirability, in
legal theory, of removing the state's influence from all factors
except those essentially necessary for the maintenance of the
schools. However, in such case the lurking danger of decadent
schools and backward progress in education is evident.
Two Alternatives: In the initial organization of their private school systems, there appear to be two alternatives upon
which the Southern states could proceed. The first would be
to continue the present public school systems, with direct state
support, for the Negroes and the establishment of private
schools only for the white children. The second alternative
would be to abandon the present public school systems entirely,
33. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1924).
34. It is highly probable that the Southern states will remove their
compulsory attendance laws to avoid, in the event integration in some
schools is accomplished, the forced attendance of white children at such
schools. Such a measure has received definite consideration in Mississippi
and has been mentioned in South Carolina. THE STATE (Columbia, S. C.),
July 12, 1954, p. 8-A, col. 6.
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including the present Negro schools, and to set up private
schools for both races.
No clear indication has been given by the formulators of
the private school plans as to which of these alternatives will
be followed. However, the former, that is, continuation of the
present Negro schools with direct support and operation by
state and local governments, will undoubtedly be the procedure
utilized.3 5 For one reason, this would not involve the Negroes
directly in the private school schemes. Consequently, an easier
transition to the private school systems might be had because
of the absence of a possible dissenting element, the Negro children and parents. In addition, the private school plans will
be subjected to sufficient condemnation and suspicion without
adding the possibility of having them scrutinized for failure
to provide Negroes with an adequate education.
It should further be noted that in the organization of private school systems, upon either of the stated alternatives,
the planners will necessarily rely upon what they hope will
be the unanimous and concerted desire of their white citizenry
to avoid integration of the races in the schools. This unanimous cooperation will be an essential factor in the effective
organization and conduct of the private schools, for any dissent on the part of white children and parents would seriously
disrupt the private school schemes. 36
35. The intimation has been made that the power in the state legis-

latures to abolish public schools, after the constitutional guaranties of

free schooling had been removed, would be used as a means of coercion

against the Negroes. The Negro parents would be told, in effect, to
cooperate and be satisfied with separate schools or lose your public
schools. The author is confident, however, that few white Southerners
would condone such a threat. He is satisfied that the expressions of
such men as Governor Byrnes of South Carolina represent the true feeling of the vast majority of the whites. Byrnes early stressed that the

state must not forget its duty to provide an adequate education to "innocent Negro children." N. Y. TIMES, May 28, 1951, p. 8-A, col. 6. And
South Carolina's special school study committee, in an interim report
issued in the summer of 1954, termed its task to be the formation of a
plan whereby South Carolina might continue its public education program ". . . without unfortunate disruption by outside forces and influences which have no knowledge of recent progress and no understanding of the problems . . . ." The committee significantly added that it
sought a course of action under which the state might ". . . offer to all
children, regardless of race, color, creed or circumstances, equal educational opportunities in an atmosphere free of social conflicts and tensions
which would tend to impede and inhibit the learning process." THE STATE
(Columbia, S. C.), July 29, 1954, p. 2-A, col. 7.
36. For example, if direct state support is continued for the Negro
schools, a dissenting white child, forced to depend upon the state's

indirect support of his private school, could logically contend that the
state was denying him the equal protection of the laws if the state refused to permit him to attend the state-provided school for Negroes.
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(2)

INDIVIDUAL ASSIGNM.ENT OF ALL STUDENTS TO
PARTICULAR SCHOOLS

Unlike the private school proposals, which involve an abandonment of the presently constituted public school systems,
there have been proposed individual assignment plans under
which the public school systems would be retained without
change. Such measures have received definite consideration
in several Southern states, the more advanced being Mississippi and Louisiana, where details of the individual assignment
proposal have been outlined in legislative form.
The following would apparently be the pertinent and essential elements of an individual assignment plan:
Power to Assign: The school district board of trustees
would have the power to designate the particular school within
the district which each enrolling child should attend. No enrollment would be final until such designation had been made,
and attendance would be limited to the school to which the
37
child was assigned.
Basis of Assignment: Each assignment would be made on
an individual basis, considering the educational needs and welfare of the particular child involved. However, additional
factors which would be taken into consideration are, as stated
in the Mississippi plan:
...the welfare and best interest of all the pupils attending the school or schools involved, the availability of
school facilities, sanitary conditions and facilities . . .
health and moral factors at the school or schools, and in
the community involved, and all other factors which the
board of trustees may consider pertinent, relevant or material in their effect on the welfare and best interest of
the school district and the particular school or schools involved.38

37. The Mississippi statute provides as follows: "SECTION 1. When
any child shall apply or present himself for enrollment in or admission
to the public schools of any school district of this state the board of
trustees of such school district shall have the power and authority to
designate the particular school or attendance center of the district in
which such child shall be enrolled and which he shall attend, and no
enrollment of a child in a school shall be final or permanent until such
designation shall be made by said board of trustees. No child shall
be entitled to attend any school or attendance center except that to
which he has been assigned by the board of trustees ... ." House Bill No.
45, Laws of Mississippi of 1954.
38. Id., Section 2.
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It must be frankly stated that such careful and lengthy enumeration of the factors to be considered in making the assignments is only intended as a blind for the realistic basis upon
which the assignments would be made-the basis of race.
The formulators of such individual assignment measures hope
to be able to rely upon such phrases of "welfare and best interest" to support a continued division of the races in separate
schools.
Territorial limits: In making the assignments, the school
district board of trustees would not be liinited by any previous specification on their part of boundaries for particular
attendance areas within the district. They would be empowered to alter or disregard such boundaries and would be free
to assign a child of one residential area to a school located
in another residential area. Thus, if a few Negro children
chanced to live in a predominantly white area and within several blocks of a white school, they could be assigned to the
school of an all-Negro area, even though such school might
be several miles from their homes.
Appeals: The finishing touches in the attempt to make
the individual assignment plan effective for the purpose of
continuing separate schools will be the establishment of an
extensive system of appeals from the initial assignment. Under
the plans as proposed, a person feeling aggrieved by the assignment of any child, presumably a Negro parent or guardian, would appeal first to the board of trustees for a reconsideration of the assignment, then to the county board of education, then to the county's circuit court to be tried de novo
as a regular case, and hence to the state supreme court. This
elaborate detail of the method of appealing from the assignments would be intended to make such appeal as cumbersome
and difficult a process as possible, so as to discourage those
who would complain of the assignments. Also, through use
of the specified channels of appeal, the formulators of the
assignment plans would seek to keep all such appeals within
the state courts and beyond the jurisdiction of federal district
courts.
Transfer of individual pupils: Almost identical to the individual assignment plan is a proposal that the school district
boards of trustees be vested with the power to freely transfer
students from one school to another. This transfer device
would be based upon the same principles and utilize the same
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theory as the individual assignment plan. The only difference
in the operation of the two plans would be that under the
transfer device, the determination of what school the child
should attend would be made after his initial attendance at the
school of his choice. Thus, in practice, if a Negro child appeared at a school set aside for whites, he could immediately
39
be transferred to an all-Negro school.
(3)

GERRYMANDERING AND REARRANGEMENT OF
SCHOOL DISTRICTS

Another possible device which the Southern planners may
utilize in their attempts to retain separate schools is a scheme
of gerrymandering and rearrangement of school districts or
attendance areas within each district. Under this device, present boundaries of attendance areas could be altered and revised so as to sharply differentiate between white and Negro
areas of residence, attempting to include within each attend40
ance area only an all-white or all-Negro population.
The best utilization of this scheme could be made in Southern towns and cities, in many of which the residence areas
of whites and Negroes have remained distinguished and apart
from each other. Thus it would not be difficult, in some cities,
to label a Negro area as one school attendance zone and a
white area as another. If necessary, there being no school
buildings presently in such designated areas, new buildings
could be built within the area.
However, difficulty would be encountered in residential
fringe areas in which whites and Negroes have become intermingled. And the rural areas of the South would offer a seemingly insurmountable obstacle to gerrymandering Negro and
white families into separate districts, since in such areas the
39. While the transfer proposal would seem to involve less trouble

than the assignment plan, since the board of trustees would have to act
only if a Negro sought admittance to a white school and would not be
bothered with the technical assignment of every child, it would seem
to be less advantageous in affording a disguise or blind for the actual
basis of the transfer. Although the resulting division of the races would
be the same, the impact of coercing would be softened by an assignment
of all pupils, both white and Negro, instead of action only in scattered
cases of Negroes alone. It is perhaps for this reason that the transfer
scheme has not received more serious consideration by the South's
planners.
40. A popular definition of "gerrymander" gives as an example the
following: ". . . to arrange school districts so that children of certain

religions or nationalities shall be brought within one district and those
of a different religion or nationality in another district." BLACK, BLACK'S
LAW DIcTIONARY (3rd ed. 1933).
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residences of the two races are interspersed with no distinguishable pattern of grouping.
Perhaps it is because of these obstacles to a successful use
'of the gerrymandering scheme that it has not been more seriously proposed as a "circumvention measure." However, the
use of the device does remain a definite possibility in those
urban communities in which the residences of the two races
have remained separated in distinct groups. In such areas, it
is entirely possible that no new creation of school zones would
be necessary. The school authorities may well rely upon present divisions as a sufficient reason for declining to admit a
Negro from across the existing boundary to a white school.
(4) TRI-SCHOOL PROPOSAL
One of the more interesting and novel proposals of the
Southern planners attempting to devise means to avoid the
effect of a decision against segregation has been the idea of
setting up a tri-school system. Under this proposal, where
there are presently two separate schools there would be created
three schools. The first of these schools would be operated on
a basis of complete integration and would be freely open to
-whites and Negroes alike. However, if a white child elected
not to attend the integrated school, he would have the choice
,of going to a second school, operated for whites only and attended by white children on a voluntary basis. Similarly, if a
Negro child desired to attend school with Negroes only, he
could attend a third school which would be maintained for his
race.
Thus, by providing a school which would be open on an
integrated basis, the proponents of this plan would hope to
avoid the complaint that they were failing to comply with the
spirit of a decision declaring segregation in the schools to be
invalid.
(5) EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER
A relatively simple means of resisting the segregation decision, requiring no administrative action or change in the
-present public school system, is the proposal to rely upon state
police power as a sufficient justification for the continuation
of separate schools for the two races. This proposal is typified by Louisiana's enacted statute and proposed constitutional
amendment.
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To warrant the use of police power to maintain segregation, a state's legislators would explain that separate schools
are essential to the protection of public health, morals, and
peace and good order. Such a police power enactment would
carefully state that while race was not its basis, the better
education of both the whites and Negroes required the prohibition of mixed schools.
:*

*

*

Such are the basic plans which might, and obviously will,
be utilized in the Southern states in an effort to maintain
their present systems of separate schools for the races. These
plans have necessarily been stated in an alternative fashion.
Obviously all could not be undertaken by one state. For example, abandonment of the public school system and a shift
to private schools would mean that the state would not attempt the individual assignment plan, since the latter involves
a continuation of the present public schools without change.
However, certain of the plans could be utilized at the same
time. The individual assignment plan could, for example, be
joined with a scheme of gerrymandering school attendance
areas. Another effective combination might be the juncture of
the tri-school proposal with the provision of tuition to private
schools. By maintaining an integrated school open to all, the
states would be technically complying with the spirit of the
Court's decision. But to all children who might elect not to
attend an integrated school, the state could furnish tuition
money to attend private schools.
The foregoing outline is not represented as being exclusive,
although all proposals which have received public attention
have been noted. Since a number of the Southern states have
maintained strict silence as to what their action might be, it
should not be doubted that other proposals may be forthcoming.
Theories of Attack
The basic evasive plans, by which the Southern states will
attempt to retain their separate school systems, will be subjected to both obvious and subtle theories of invalidation.
In considering these theories, it must be remembered that
the Court has ruled that constitutional and statutory provisions requiring the separation of the races for the purpose of
public schooling are invalid as a denial of the equal protec-
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tion of the laws to Negro school children. This decision has
the effect of endowing Negro children with a right not to be
segregated and not to be denied admission to state schools
heretofore set aside for whites on the basis of their race or
color.
The attacks on the circumvention measures will, in essence,
be based upon this established right, and the charge will be
made that the various evasive proposals, as substitutes, are
equally a denial of equal protection. However, unlike the statutory mandates which could be declared invalid because of
their very wording, the circumvention measures will not lend
themselves to any such "on the face" attack. Those attacking
such measures will necessarily have to show that the practice,
under each specific measure, in regard to the admission of
Negro children to schools, has been one of discrimination because of race or color, and further, that such discriminatory
acts are the equivalent of the formerly directly required segregation, in so far as the applicability of the Fourteenth
Amendment is concerned.
Such attacks will be leveled against each of the outlined
evasive measures. The following is a consideration of the possible theories of attack to each of the basic circumvention
plans, with an estimation of the probable success of each attack.
(1)

TRANSITION TO PRIVATE SCHOOLS, WITH OR WITHOUT
DIRECT OR INDIRECT STATE SUPPORT

The plans to shift from state supported and managed
schools to state-wide systems of private schools are based upon
the theory that the mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment
against the denial of equal protection of the laws, i.e., against
discrimination, on the basis of race or color, is directed solely
against what is termed "state action"-action of a state or one
of its subdivisions. 41 Consequently, the Southern planners
theorize that if the state and its subdivisions, with their support, management and influence, are removed from the area of
public schooling, the substituted private management and conduct of the schools would not be subject to the provisions of
41. The pertinent provision of the Fourteenth Amendment is as follows: ". . . No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall

any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
laws."

protection of the
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the Fourteenth Amendment. Hence, if this theory is effective, the action of the private schools in discriminating or
denying admission to Negroes would not incur the inhibitions
of the Amendment.
The effectiveness of this theory is directly dependent upon
the ability of the state to completely disassociate itself and its
subdivisions from the maintenance of schools. 42

Any vestige

of state support, management or supervision would seriously
hamper the efforts to utilize the theory of private action.
The Southern planners have apparently acknowledged this
principle, and have recognized that their private school plans
are confronted by a complex dilemma. Simply stated, the problem they face is how to remove all vestiges of state action
from the area of schooling and yet provide the financing necessary to run any type of school system.
Faced with this formidable roadblock, the formulators of
the private school plans have resorted to the idea of having
the states indirectly aid and support the private schools. Under
their principal device, as noted, the states will grant a sum to
each child to be used by the child to pay his tuition fee charged
by the private school. Other such modes of indirect aid have
been noted and will undoubtedly be undertaken.
It is upon the courts' acknowledgment that the states will
have thus divorced themselves from the provision of schooling
that the success of the private school plans principally depends. And to so acknowledge, the courts will necessarily have
to find that no action on the part of the state or its subdivisions, within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, is
present in the financing, management or supervision of the
private schools.
It is therefore apparent that the success or failure of the
private school plans will depend to a large measure upon the
utilization and application by the courts of the principle of
state action as necessary to make the Fourteenth Amendment
operative. Before considering the various alternatives possible under the private school plans, it would be well to explore
this principle of state action, its ramifications and the extent
to which it has been developed.
42. In the subsequent discussions of state action, it should be remembered that action of any subdivision or unit of the state government,
including counties and municipalities, is deemed to be the action of the
state for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, upon the principle of delegation by the state of its authority. For the application of
this principle to the board of trustees of a school district, see Gonzales
v. Sheely, 96 F. Supp. 1004 (1951).
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The Basic Concept of State Action. The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, 43 proposed and ratified during the aftermath of the War Between the States, were intended, at the
least, to protect the recently freed Negroes against the use
of the governmental authority of the states in a manner prejudicial to them.
It was not made entirely clear by the proponents of the
Amendments what types of governmental authority their inhibitions directed toward, but it has since been suggested that
the formulators of the Amendments and the Congress passing
them had in mind only direct state legislative action. 44 Certainly the first tests of state action as incurring
the inhibitions
45
of the Amendments were of state statutes.
It was evident even then, however, that a state could infringe upon protected rights in other ways than by positive
legislation, and in 1879, the Court, in a meaningful dictum,
suggested that state executive and judicial acts were equally
within the concept of state action. 46 Subsequent cases fully
justified this dictum and have included within the sphere of
state action all acts of a state's administrative agencies and political subdivisions. 47 In addition, the courts have recognized
that state action exists when officials of a state's judiciary
act both in denying due process in procedural matters and in
48
formulating and applying a state's substantive law.
Only shortly after establishing the bases of the new concept of state action, however, the Supreme Court was faced
with the necessity of limiting the bounds of the concept to
avoid its complete obliteration. The test came to the Court
as a result of the enactment by Congress in 1875 of the Civil
Rights Act,49 which established both civil and criminal of43. The two amendments contain identical phraseology as to their requirement of state action, and have been treated alike by the courts and
legal writers in the development of the concept of state action.
44. Note, 96 U. OF PA. L. REv. 402, 403 (1948).
45. Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (U.S. 1872) ; Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
46. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879).
47. Examples are: public service commission, Reagan v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894); tax board, Raymond v. Chicago
Union Traction Co., 207 U.S. 20 (1907); governing board of state educational institution, Hamilton v. University of California Regents, 293
U.S. 245 (1934); municipal corporation, Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los
Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913). See Rottschaeffer, Constitutional Law
441 (1939).
48. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879); American Federation of
Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941). See also Note, 96 U. Or PA. L.
RE.v. 402, n. 22 and n. 23 at 404 (1948).
49. 18 STAT. 335 (1875).
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fenses for discrimination on the basis of race or color by
private owners of inns, theaters, places of amusement and
public conveyances. Considering this statute in the light of the
Fourteenth Amendment's ,requirement of state action, the
Court declared that individual invasion of individual rights
was beyond the bounds of the Amendment and that the statute
was therefore unconstitutional."0
This theoretical holding has been reiterated to this day. As
recently as 1948 the Court said:
Since the decision of this Court in the Civil Rights
Cases, ... the principle has become firmly embedded in
our constitutional law that the action inhibited by the
first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such
action as may fairly be said to be that of the States. That
Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful. 51
It would thus appear that the Court had adopted and consistently applied an obvious and commonly understood interpretation of state action, as official acts of the state through
one of its official agencies. This interpretation was in accord with the basic constitutional theory that Federal regulation was addressed only to the states and policing of individuals was to be left to the states. To conclude that this
principle has been strictly adhered to, however, would be both
erroneous and misleading.
Expcat-sion of the Concept. Despite the apparent immunization of private or individual acts from the inhibitions of the
Amendments, decisions of recent years have so extended the
application of the state action concept that the originally established distinctions between state and private action have
become practically meaningless. The supposed immunity of
private acts has been increasingly stripped away and private
organizations and persons, under varying circumstances, have
50. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). The Court subsequently
ruled in the same vein in regard to a similar statute enacted in pursuance
of the Fifteenth Amendment, holding a statute making it a crime for
any person to delay by bribe, threat or force a citizen in qualifying
himself to vote was unconstitutional because, among other reasons, it

was not confined to the interdiction of state action. James v. Bowman,
190 U.S. 127 (1903).
51. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948). The significance of
this statement in view of the effect of the Court's holding is doubtful,
as later discussion will point out.
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been held subject to the same limitations 5as2 those directly
placed upon the states by the Amendments.
It has been aptly suggested that this expansion of the concept of state action has been correlated to and has accompanied
increased governmental regulation of the individual, the increasing exercise by private agencies of functions previously
considered public, and attempts to circumvent the Amendments by use of subterfuges of purported individual action."s
It may indeed be true that if the concept were not so expanded
many areas of discrimination would have been left without
the effective instruments of correction present in the Amendments. But for whatever reason, it is evident that in the
"continuous spectrum" of which public and private action
are "opposite poles,'

54

state action as a legal concept has

moved relentlessly into the area previously considered to be
private action.
The paths of this extension of state action have been neither
logical nor coherent. Adding to the inherent confusion has
been the inability of legal writers, attempting to analyze the
increasing encroachment into the sphere of private action, to
agree upon their characterizations of the expansion. 55
The best such characterization appears to be that the expansion has developed under the following two distinguishable
facets: (1) the instrumentality theory, under which action
of apparent private organizations has been considered to be
state action because of various sub-theories; and, (2) the
determination of what action by an admittedly state agency is
to be considered as state action within the scope of the Amendments.
The instrumentality theory, under which acts of purportedly
52. See Notes, APPLICABILITY Op THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO
PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS, 61 HARv. L. REV. 344 (1948) and THE DIsINTEGRATION OF A CONCEPT-STATE ACTION UNDER THE 14TH AND 15TH
AMENDMENTS, 96 U. OF PA. L. REV. 402 (1948). The author of the latter
note significantly commented: "The extension of state action might
appear cause for concern. From a conceptual point of view state action
has undergone a gradual disintegration which makes definition today
illusory; and from a constitutional point of view there has been an encroachment by the federal power upon the state's traditional domain."

Id.
53. Huber, REVOLUTION IN PRIVATE LAW, 6 S. C. L. Q. 8, 17 (1953).

54. Comment, 57 YALE L. J. 426, 434 (1948).
55. For three different treatments of the expansion see the articles
heretofore noted, notes 52 and 53, supra. The author of the latter article
commented: ". . . the expansion has failed to follow any logical road,
unless a general though erratic trend toward effectuating the purpose
of the Amendments, no matter how, can be considered logical development." Huber, supra note 53, at 19.
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private organizations have been stamped as state action, has
had both its origin and its furtherest extension in the cases,
dealing with the attempts of Southern political party organizations to exclude Negroes from voting in their primary elections.
It has been employed to find the existence of state action
in such cases in the following situations:
Where a state statute permitted the party's executive committee to prescribe qualifications for its members-Nixon v.
Condon. 6
Where the state prescribed statutory regulations for the
conduct of the primary election and connected it by statuteswith the ensuing general election-Smith v. Allwright.57
Where all statutes regulating or affecting the primary had
been repealed by the state, but the primary remained both an
integral part of the election procedure and the only realistic
part of the election-Rice v. Elmore5" and Baskin v. Brown.59
Where there had never been any statutory recognition of
the primary, regulation of it, or connection of it with the
other parts of the election machinery, but the primary effectively controlled the choice of the election-Terry v. Adams.60
The primary decisions do, of course, have distinguishable
criteria of their own-the tests that the primaries were an
integral part of the election machinery or that they effectively
controlled the choice of the election and were its only realistic
part. Nevertheless, it is evident that they also involved arbitrary findings of the presence of state action in situations
where the courts had previously been unable to discern such.
One commentator said of Terry v. Adams, the most extensive
use of the instrumentality theory:
Yet this decision is a startling one in finding state
action in the exercise of political choice by a private association in no special way assisted by the state. No previous decision had found state action except in state statutes, the use of state funds, the acts of state officials,
56. 286 U.S. 73 (1932).

This case may be considered the origin of

the57.instrumentality
321 U.S. 649 theory.
(1944). That these decisions do evidence a definite
liberalization of the Court's attitude toward state action is clear when
it is remembered that only nine years before Smith v. Allwright, the
Court had declined to rule that the statutory connections between the
party primary and the state rendered the party's act state action. Grovey
v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935).
58. 165 F. 2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948).
59. 174 F. 2d 391 (4th Cir. 1949).
60. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
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or the discriminatory application by a state of its laws.
This decision effects a substantial change in the meaning
of this vital constitutionalrequirement .... 61 [Emphasis
supplied.]
The underlying theoretical bases of the findings of state
action in these cases have been variously defined- Some would
attribute it to the state's provision or regulation of the means
by which the private party has been able to discriminate, thus
giving the private party cause to be considered a state instrumentality since the state had, in essence, endowed it with the
power to make its discrimination effective. 62 This theory
would appear sufficient to explain the Smith v. Allwright decision, where there was in existence a statutory web connecting the primary with the state's election machinery, but it is
difficult to apply the idea of state-supplied ability to the subsequent cases where there were no such statutory connections.
These later decisions would appear to be in accord with
a further basis which has been advanced as underlying the
instrumentality theory-that the performance by the private
parties of a governmental function made them a state instrumentality. 63
Thus, the proposition seems well established that the limits
of the Fourteenth Amendment are applicable to the activities
of a private organization which either exercises a governmental function and/or has a connecting web with the state of
state supervision, financing, or sponsorship. 4
The second avenue of the expansion of the state action
concept has been classified as the area of determination of
61. Howe, THE SUPREME COURT, 1952 TERi, 67 HARV. L. REv. 91, 105
(1953).
62. Huber, supra, note 53, at 17; Note, 96 U. OF PA. L. Rnv. 402, 408
(1948).

63. See Hyman, SEGREGATION AND THE FOURTEENTH AiENDMENT,

VAND. L. REV. 555, 558 (1951).

4

Both of these theoretical bases have

been supported by decisions outside the area of the primary cases. One
such case involved the act of a privately-oumed town (governmental

function) in abridging the religious freedom of an alleged trespasser
upon its streets. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). Another involved the discriminatory act of a city library system which owed its
powers to the state and which was dependent for financial support upon
the city's voluntary appropriations (state-supplied ability to discrim-

inate). Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F. 2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945),
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945). But cf. Norris v. Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore, 78 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md. 1948).
64. The only doubts which exist as to this proposition have been
aptly attributed to these circumstances: "(1) The Supreme Court, while
implicitly subscribing to this view, has never expressly stated the proposition; (2) much uncertainty exists as to the exact relationship necessary to invoke the Amendment." Note, 61 HARV. L. REv. 344, 347 (1948).
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what action by an admittedly state agency is to be considered
as state action for the purpose of invoking the Fourteenth
Amendment.65 This area has seen development of the concept
in two ways.
The first of these has been the establishment of the view
that a state acts even when its agencies abuse or exceed the
limits of their technical legal authority by acting in a manner
either unauthorized by state law or actually prohibited by it.66
Further expansion of state action in this area has occurred
in the significant decisions which have enhanced the role a
state court may play in the creation of state action. In the
first of these decisions, Shelley v. Kraemer, 7 the Court construed the action of a state court in enforcing a racial restrictive covenant which had been privately entered into as sufficient state action to support the applicability of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The second decision, Barrows v. JacksoW6 8 utilized the state action theory of the Shelley case and held the
equal protection clause of the Amendment to be equally applicable to a state court's award of damages for the violation of
such a restrictive covenant.
Prior to 1948, and Shelley v. Kraemer, the prohibited state
action, while having been expanded, was still confined to instances of direct discrimination by groups which were either
obvious state agencies or which could be labeled state instrumentalities. The influence of a state court in acting upon and
enforcing private discriminatory agreements was considered
too attenuated to be itself the prohibited state action.69
65. "The problem is one of determining whether the causal relation
between acts of what is admittedly a state agency and the resultant
denial of a civil right is sufficiently direct to bring that action within
the constitutional ban." Note, 48 CoL. L. REv. 1241, 1242 (1948).
66. Since this particular facet of expansion will have little application to the private school plans under consideration, no extensive attempt is made to show the pattern of its development. This theory was
first employed in Eo parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879), was questioned in Barney v. New York, 193 U.S. 430 (1904), but was subsequently reiterated in Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 207 U.S.
20 (1907) and Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). The illogic
of this particular expansion of state action has been generally criticized. See Huber, supra note 53, at 19, and Note, 96 U. OF PA. L. REv.
402 (1948). The latter commentator, in describing the above cases,
wrote: "The courts ... in dealing with the misuse of state power have
not followed the dictates of pure logic, but seem to have taken an analogy
to respondeat superior,with a resulting extension of state action." Ibid.
But cf. Hyman, supra note 63, at 558; Hale, FORO AND THE STATE... ,
35 C L. L. R v. 149,182-183 (1935).
67. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
68. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
69. See Note, 48 CoL. L. REv. 1241, 1242-43 (1948).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol7/iss1/5

28

1954]

Nicholson: The Legal Standing of the South's School Resistance Proposals
ScaooL. RE SISTANCE PROPOSALS

Shelley v. Kraemer cut sharply across this established cleavage between direct acts of discrimination and indirect enforcement or sanction of private discriminatory acts. The import
of the decision is vast.
At the very least, Shelley v. Kraemer and Barrows v. Jackson establish that if a state court lends its sanctionto a private
act of discrimination which would be a denial of equal protection if done directly by the state (either by admitted state
agency or an apparent state instrumentality), then such sanction is a sufficient indication that the state has acted as a
party to the discriminatory act to support the invocation of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Broadly interpreted, the decisions would seem to make
. . . any and all action by any arm of the state, whether
direct or indirect, close or distant, alone or in conjunction with
private individuals or groups, state action under the Four' 70
teenth Amendment.
It is quite probable that the Court did not foresee that
these decisions could be logically applied to render largely
unimportant all previous distinctions between state and private action.7 1 It is also probable that the court did not intend
the logic of its decisions to be applied to any and all acts of
72
discrimination by private individuals.
70. Huber, supra note 53, at 24. This article is an excellent analysis
of the varied effects of Shelley v. Kraemer. See Note, 48 CoL. L. REV.
1241 (1948), with Comment, 45 MICH. L. REV. 733 (1947) for divergent
views as to the desirability of the Shelley rationale.
71. See Huber, supranote 53, at 25-26, where the author illustrates the
undermining effect of Shelley v. Kraemer upon the instrumentality
theory. He notes that previous utilizations of the instrumentality theory
have led to court actions. Since this is true, he points out, the plaintiffs
in such actions would no longer have to rely upon the establishment
of a state instrumentality, but could, under Shelley v. Kraemer, point
to the state court's action upon the alleged discrimination as the necessary state action.
72. The realistic effect of the two decisions can be simply stated: suppose a private apartment owner rents only to whites, having no basis
for excluding Negroes other than their race or color; suppose further
that a Negro alleges the owner's action to be a denial of equal protection, and a state court dismisses the Negro's suit for failure to state
a cause of action. Has the state acted and become a party to the discrimination? The logical import of the decisions is that it has. The same
reasoning would seem to apply to a property owner's refusal to sell to
a Negro. See Comment, 45 MIcH. L. REv. 733, 742 (1947). The author
of this article, 'written prior to the Shelley decision, commented: "If it
should be held that court enforcement of race restrictive covenants is
state action, the basis for this distinction (between private and state
action) would be obscured; and on the theory that the state is sanctioning final consequences whenever it protects a citizen in the exercise of
any of his property or contract rights, the Fourteenth Amendment would
emerge with unforeseeable implications for our daily lives." Id. at 747.
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Nevertheless, the decisions stand as delivered. Their language cannot now be retracted. Whether their use of the philosophy of state sanction of private discriminatory acts will
be restricted or extended in future cases is an interesting speculation. One commentator who intensively studied the effect
of the decisions concluded:
Past constitutional history would suggest.., that even if
the Shelley doctrine should be limited in the near future,
and not be extended as far as we have determined that it
logically could be, the more distant future holds the promise, or threat, that the more extreme view will be accepted. We have seen that the Court has continually expanded its concept of what constitutes state action. While
it may have used language in the Shelley case which took
it rather further than it expected, any limiting of the
effect of the case is likely to be temporary, and, in time,
we can expect the broader interpretation of7 3its language
to determine what constitutes state action.
Such is the present status of the legal concept of state action
as a prerequisite to the invocation of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is against the aura of expansion of the concept that
the private school plans under consideration will be tested.
In examining these plans, the courts may well be required to
either limit this expansion or crystallize it as accepted doctrine. Either way, the present doubts as to the intention underlying the expansion will be resolved.
All of the theories of attack on the private school plans
rest upon the basis of the Fourteenth Amendment's mandate
that no state should deny a person equal protection of the laws
because of his race or color. As has already been noted, two
factors are necessary to make the Amendment applicable.
The first is an actual act of discrimination or denial of equal
protection, and the second is the presence of state action sufficient to make the act attributable to the state. In considering each of the following theories, the basic assumption has
been made that a denial of equal protection is present. This
necessary discriminatory act will exist in the refusal of a private school, organized exclusively for whites, to enroll an
otherwise qualified Negro.
73. Huber, supra note 53, at 31. Emphasis supplied. Prior to his conclusion the author noted the possibilities of restricting the Shelley doctrine.
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Hence, the crux of each of the theories involves a finding
of the necessary state action to permit a direct suit against the
discriminating private organization. An outline of the possibilities of state action existing in each of the variations possible under the private school plans follows.

Action: Direct state support of the private school.
Attack: An obvious creation of state instrumentalities.
The improbable possibility has been noted that a state may
attempt to evade the invalidation of its segregation statutes
by forming private corporations to replace its present public
schools for whites, but continue present direct state support of
the schools. This direct support might involve one or more
such factors as an original grant of the land and school buildings, direct state subsidies to the private school groups, and
continued state supervision.
This type of action has been termed improbable because it
is obviously open to successful attack.
The attack would be based upon the established state instrumentality concept of state action, and would rely upon the
theory of Nixon v. Condon 74 and Smith v. Allwright7r that
where the state supplies the means by which a private group
is able to discriminate, then the act of the purported private
organization is, in fact, the act of the state.
A closely analogous situation to that which would be presented by direct state support of the private schools has already been examined by the courts and exposed as state ac0
involved an origition. Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library"
nally privately-endowed library system whose affairs were
conducted by a board of trustees incorporated as a private
group. The physical facilities used by the library were owned
by the city of Baltimore and annual sums contributed by the
city and state amounted to 99 per cent of the library's total
budget. In addition, the library's employees were given the
same status as other city employees as to salary schedules and
retirement benefits, and the city both approved and paid all
library disbursements through regular city channels. The
court of appeals did not hesitate, in reversing the district
74. 286 U.S. 73 (1932).

75. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
76. 149 F. 2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945).
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court's decision, 77 to term the library's act of discrimination
in excluding a qualified Negro from its training school to be
the act of the state, saying that the library has been supported
from its inception by the state. Asking how the library's discriminatory act could be justified when the state, through the
municipality, continued to supply it with its means of existence, the court found its duty to be the simple application of
73
the state instrumentality theory.
This case very well illustrates what types of direct action
on the part of the state in contributing to the support of the
private schools would be prohibited. The original grant of
land and buildings (or use of state-owned facilities), direct
state subsidies, continued state supervision, and treatment of
school personnel as state employees would all be caught under
the Kerr decision as state action.
It is perhaps true that this case presented a combination
of more factors and involved a greater connection with the
state than might be present under this plan of action for private schools. Because of the overwhelming web of connections with the state, it is uncertain what importance the court
attributed to each of the factors present. However, the court's
stress upon the state's provision of the means of existence of
the institution does indicate that the economic features were
the principal basis for the finding of state action. The Kerr
case can fairly be taken as authority for the proposition that
if the state furnishes virtually all of the funds upon which the
institution operates and allows it to use state buildings without charge, the institution's acts will be imputed to the state.
Supporting the latter point, use of state facilities, is the case
of Lawrence v. Hancock,79 which found the presence of a state
instrumentality in a swimming pool conducted by a non-profit
private organization which had leased the pool, without consideration,from the city.
Suppose, however, the state should provide only a portion
of the funds of the private group, make some charge for the
lease or sale of land and buildings, and completely cut off all
ties with the schools in so far as personnel regulation and right
to control are concerned. Would the provision by direct subsidies of only a portion of the school's funds, plus the use of
77. 54 1. Supp. 514 (D. Md. 1944).
78. 149 F. 2d 212, 219.
79. 76 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.W.Va. 1948).
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facilities obtained from the state, be sufficient to stamp the
private school as a state instrumentality?
In pondering this question, the defenders of the private
schools may find some solace in a subsequent case arising in
Baltimore, Norris v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore.8 0
Here a private art school denied admission to a Negro. It
appeared that in exchange for a state subsidy which amounted
to 23 per cent of the school's total budget, the school admitted,
tuition free, a certain number of students (5 per cent of total
enrollment) appointed by state political officials. The school
further rented from the city for $500 one building which
would have rented commercially for $12,000. These were the
only factors of state aid or control present. Considering them,
the same district judge who was reversed in the Kerr decision
ruled that the school corporation had retained its private
status and that its discriminatory act could not be attributed
to the state. The court rejected as untenable the argument
that whenever the state or city advances money to a private
corporation of an educational nature, which funds become
mingled with the general funds of the institution, that thereafter action of the institution is state action within the scope
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The decision has been variously criticized for its close distinction of the Kerr case (relied on differences as to control)
and for its strict reliance upon the right to control test-that
a corporation is of a public nature only when there is reserved
public control over the management of its affairs.-"
But even had the Norris decision been more soundly developed and rendered solely on the actual issue involved-the
presence of state aid, it must be conceded that it does represent, in so far as the instrumentality theory alone is concerned, a border-line situation. In its rapid development of the
instrumentality theory of state action, the Supreme Court was
not faced with the necessity of defining the exact relation80. 78 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md. 1948).
81. For criticisms which roundly denounce the Norris decision as contrary to the trend of expansion of the state action concept, see 62 HARM.
L. REV. 126 (1948), and Reppy, CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES,
146-147 (1951). And significantly, the application of the right to con-

trol test to such cases was impliedly repudiated by the Supreme Court
in Nixon v. Condon when the Court began the development of the theory
of state-supplied means of discrimination even though the state exercised
no control over the affairs of the organization. This repudiation was
made even clearer by Rice v. Elmore, 165 F. 2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947), applying the instrumentality theory even though the state had expressly
repealed all regulatory statutes.
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ship which would be necessary to invoke the theory.82 Nor did
the Court deal with any cases applying the theory to situations involving economic assistance by the state. Consequently,
the determination of whether an instrumentality exists can
only be a matter of individual interpretation in each case, with
little authoritative guide. A court could thus use the theory
but conclude that the proportion of state assistance present
was not sufficient to make the organization involved a state
instrumentality. If such a court should close its eyes to precedent outside the immediate area of the instrumentality theory,
then the amount of state assistance which it deemed insufficient to constitute state action could well vary in greater or
lesser proportions from the 23 per cent present in the Norris
case.
However, the expansion of the state action concept, the
Court's determination that a state should not be able to perform, by indirect means, discriminatory acts which it could
not do directly, and the Court's zeal in over-turning all such
circumventions, all combine to indicate that a court would not
be able to close its eyes and fail to recognize the existence
of a state instrumentality.
Considering the extent to which the Court has already disregarded previously established dogma 3 in striking down what
it considered to be subterfuges of state action, can it be doubted that, in considering another such subterfuge, the Court
would adopt as its precept the argument rejected in the Norris
decision-that whenever the state or city advances money
to a private corporation of an educational nature, which funds
become mingled with the general funds of the institutions,
that thereafter action of the institution is state action within
the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Action: Indirect state support of the private schools.
82. See note 64, supra.
83. It is generally conceded that in Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461

(1953), the Court abandoned a mechanical approach in utilizing the instrumentality theory and resolved that it would look to the realistic

result which the instrumentality was able to accomplish. See 33 BOSTON
U. L. Rpv. 511, 515 (1953) and text supported by note 61, supra. And
the logical extension of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), to

prohibit any aid by the state, however far removed from the actual
act of discrimination, has already been noted. See text supported by
notes 70 and 73, supra. The only obstacle to the application of the logic
of these decisions to the present situation would be the Court's willingness to so apply them.
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Attack: Although less obvious, equally a creation of state
instrumentalities.
Apparently conceding that direct state aid of the private
schools, whatever proportion the aid might be to the schoolg'
total expenses, could be successfully attacked, the formulators
,of the private school schemes have never seriously proposed
that direct support be attempted, and have instead focused
their energies upon devising means of indirectly channelling
to the private schools the financial support which they will
require.
The means of indirect financial support, as have been outlined, may take the form of special payments for public services rendered by the private schools, direct provision of services by the state such as transportation of students and provision of textbooks, and principally, the device of providing
each child with tuition grants to pay his expenses in attending the private schools. Other features of this indirect aid
may be the grant of tax exemption and the power of eminent
domain to the private schools. In addition, the present school
lands and buildings may be made available to the private
schools through either lease or sale at nominal sums.
Through the adoption of such or similar measures, the state
will have nominally divorced itself from the conduct and management of the private schools which white children may elect
to attend. Will this apparent removal of the state from the
provision of such schools be effective, however, when tested
for the presence of state action? All indications are that it
will not.
It will require no remarkable feat of deduction for the courts
to conclude that through the combination of such indirect
modes as have been noted, the states will have in factual
reality provided the means of existence of the private schools.
'The result will then follow that by providing the schools with
their ability to exist, the states will have, in fact, enabled
the discrimination of the private schools to be effected.
Ample evidence is available to indicate that this process
of tracing the finances of the schools through their intermediate diversions back to their source would be undertaken. The
striking similarity between the more extensive primary decisions and the courts' probable construction of the private
school plans is again evident.
After first declaring the primaries to be permeated with
state action because of the existence of statutory connections
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with the state, the courts then extended this holding to cover
primaries where the statutory connections had been repealed
or had never existed.8 4 In addition, the courts struck down
attempts of the political parties involved to accomplish the
inhibited exclusion of Negroes by indirect measures. Since
direct limitation of their membership to whites had been invalidated, the parties adopted, as requisites for registration,
oaths and qualification tests which, because of their nature,
would have effectively excluded Negroes. All such measurewere declared invalid.85 The court ruling on the oath requirement termed the measure an attempt "... to do by indirectiol
that which we held ... they could not do.. .," and said: "The
devices adopted showed plainly the unconstitutional purpose
for which they were designed ....,,86
Since, when considering the private school plans, the courts
will have before them a ruling that segregation for the purpose of public schooling is unconstitutional, it becomes inconceivable that similar language would not be used in striking
down indirect support of private schools which continue segregation.
The comments already made as to the applicability of Terry"
v. Adazs and Shelley v. Kraemer8 7 apply with equal force
to this situation of indirect aid. The language used by the
Court in the Shelley opinion-"State action refers to exertion
of state power in all forms"18 -has already been employed
by members of one court in urging that an organization accorded indirect state aid had become a state instrumentality
for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.8 9 The features of indirect aid involved in Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town
Corp. were tax exemption and use of the power of eminent
domain to assist a New York City housing redevelopment
project. Although a majority of the New York court rejected
the Negro plaintiff's thesis that such assistance had rendered
the organization a governmental instrumentality and thus that
its discrimination was attributable to the state, the effect of
this holding is lessened by the closeness of the decision (4-3)
84. See notes 58 and 60, supra.
85. Baskin v. Brown, 174 F. 2d 391 (4th Cir. 1949)-oath; Davis v.
Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D.Ala. 1949), aff'd mem., 386 U.S. 933 (1949)
-qualification test.
86. Baskin v. Brown, supra note 85, at 393.
87. See note 83, supra.
88. 334 U.S. 1, 20.
89. See dissenting opinion in Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299
N.Y. 512, 87 N.E. 2d 541, 553 (1949), cert. denied, 839 U.S. 981 (1950).
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and the fact that it can fairly be termed one of expediency. 90
The remarkable factor in the Dorsey case is that the court
did consider the features of state aid present (tax exemption
and power of condemnation, together with certain regulatory
powers given the city to over-see the project) sufficient to
raise a serious question as to whether the organization had
become a state instrumentality. 91 The insistence by the dissenting members of the court that these features had in fact
imbued the project with a governmental character adds to
the strength of the case. The dissenters, after pointing to an
"aggressive expansion" of the concept of state action, said:
As long as there is present the basic element, an exertion of governmental power in some form, as long as there
is present something "more" than purely private conduct
.. the momentum of the principle carries it into areas

12
once thought to be untouched by its direction.

Although the majority opinion in the Dorsey decision points
out that the features of tax exemption and eminent domain
had never been considered sufficient to render the recipients
thereof subject to the Fourteenth Amendment, 93 it can well
be asked whether such a finding might not be forthcoming
90. The city, in entering into the contract to assist the housing project,
made a deliberate decision not to demand non-discrimination. Immediately after the institution of this project, however, the city prohibited
any further assistance to similar projects which did discriminate. See
Hyman, supra, note 63, at 558.
91. While tax exemptions may have the same economic effect as
direct subsidy from tax funds, the Supreme Court has treated the
two differently, declaring that the restraints of due process and equal
protection do not impose a rigid rule of equality on a state in selecting
subjects of tax exemption. Compare Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co.,
301 U.S. 495, 509 (1937), with Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655
(U.S. 1875). Significantly, the court made no point of this distinction
in the Dorsey case, and it does not appear that the distinction, having
been developed in cases involving economic equal protection, could be
logically utilized in a case alleging the denial of equal protection to
exist in racial discrimination. Unlike tax exemption, the grant of the
power of eminent domain to institutions has already been considered
such assistance as to require that the organization receiving the power
not discriminate. See Connecticut College v. Calvert, 87 Conn. 421, 88
A. 633 (1913); Univ. of So. Calif. v. Robbins, 1 Cal. App. 2d 523, 37
P. 2d 163 (1934); Note, 61 HARV. L. Rnv. 344, 351 (1948).
92. 87 N.E. 2d 541, 553. The dissenting opinion added that this liberalized philosophy of state action runs through the decisions which
deny to a state or city ".

.

. the power to avoid their constitutional

responsibilities by leasing or assigning to private persons important
projects or functions in which discrimination is practiced." Id. at 555.
93. Id. at 551.
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after the Court declares that a state may not require segrega94
tion in its schools.
Several of the other features which may be included in a
state's indirect support of the private schools, notably provision of school bus transportation and textbooks, have been
considered by the courts. This consideration was occasioned
by an attack on such features of state assistance which is
somewhat, though not wholly, analogous to the present theory
of state action-that state aid to sectarian schools, or to children attending such schools, violated constitutional inhibitions
against state support of religious institutions.9 5

The Supreme Court has had before it challenges of both
these services rendered by the state, school bus transportation9" and textbooks. 7 In both cases, however, the Court declined to term such services as being within the prohibited
sphere, treating both such forms of state aid as being aid to
the students attending the sectarian or private schools, rather
than to the schools themselves.
The defenders of the private school plans being considered
might, therefore, use these cases and the apparent analogy
which they present to argue that such indirect aid by the states
as provision of school bus service and textbooks would be an
94. This result has been suggested as a logical probability. Note, 61
HARV. L. REv. 344, 850 (1948). Such a finding would, of course, have
enormous consequences. Virtually all of the private schools and colleges
of the nation have been granted exemption from property taxes. A
holding that this assistance rendered them state instrumentalities would
extend the Court's invalidation of segregation to completely remove all
existing racial barriers, even in presently-existing private institutions.
95. The analogy can be found in the over-all comparison of the inhibitions against state aid present in the two situations. The Fourteenth
Amendment's requirement of state action prohibits such state support
as leaves the supported organization, in fact, a state instrumentality.
This includes direct state financial assistance and any indirect assistance
which is, in substance, the same. The inhibitions against aid to sectarian institutions likewise prohibit direct state financial subsidy. See
Note, 60 HARv. L. Rav. 793, 795 (1947) for an account of what has been
held to constitute direct support. Strikingly, for present purposes, this
prohibition has been held to include aid in the form of students' tuition
or teachers' salaries. Williams v. Stanton Dist., 173 Ky. 708, 191 S.W.

507 (1917).

96. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). This was a
5-4 decision. The dissenting members of the Court would apparently
have outlawed any aid which directly or indirectly benefitted sectarian
schools. Id. at 18 and 28.
97. Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 281 U.S. 370
(1930). This case, while having in its background aid to sectarian
schools, was instead based upon the attack of an unconstitutional use
of public funds for a private purpose. The Court held the provision
of textbooks to be for a public purpose, however, upon the theory that
the students alone were the beneficiaries of the aid, not the private
schools.
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aid to the individual school children and not sufficient state
support to constitute the private schools involved state instrumentalities. It should be noted, however, that the theory upon
which the Court relied can be logically criticized9" and that
the Court's decision in at least one of the cases was contrary
to substantial authority. 99 Above all, the public policy considerations inherent in these decisions, especially Everson ,v.
Board
of Education (the fact that it was rendered in the crucial area
of the relation of the state to religious minorities), should deter any strong reliance upon the theory which they expounded.
The Court may have been willing to make concessions in the
area of state assistance to sectarian schools which it would
not be willing to similarly grant to private schools which are
organized as substitutes to carry on segregation.
However, the foregoing features of tax exemption, eminent
domain, and provision of textbooks and school bus facilities
may very well be considered by a court as not sufficient state
action to make the Fourteenth Amendment applicable, especially in view of the effect which such a finding would have
on the distinctions between public and private institutions.
But it is extremely doubtful that any court would have such
features alone to consider in construing a state's indirect
support of private schools. The presence of indirect financial
support, through such a device as the tuition grants, will probably render these additional factors academic.
The realities of financing adequate elementary and secondary education for its children (especially for the children of
its poorer classes who could not afford high tuition fees
if tax support of the schools were eliminated) necessitates that
a state continue to levy taxes for this purpose and support
the schools through tax funds. To the credit of the states of
98. One writer has termed the theory of "aid to students" a "clumsy
and ineffective" device. Note, 96 U. OF PA. L. REv. 230, 238 (1947).
A New York court had earlier struck down the theory, saying, of the
furnishing of books and supplies:

".

..

if not directly in aid of the

parochial schools, it certainly is in indirect aid. The scholars do not
use text-books and ordinary supplies apart from their studies in the
school. They want them for the sole purpose of their work there." Smith
v. Donahue, 202 App. Div. 656, 195 N.Y.S. 715, 719 (1922).
99. For cases contrary to Everson v. Board of Education, see Annotation, 168 A.L.R. 1434 (1947). Of the cases noted, all except three
(including Everson) held the provision of school bus service to pupils
of parochial or private schools to be unconstitutional. In a decision
subsequent to the Everson case, the court of the State of Washington
reiterated its earlier opinion that such service was prohibited and disagreed with the Everson decision. Visser v. Nooksack Valley School
Dist., 33 Wash. 2d 699, 207 P. 2d 198 (1949). Again note the vigorous
dissents in the Everson case, note 96 supra.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1954

39

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [1954], Art. 5
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 7

the Deep South, it has not been seriously proposed that such
support be ended.
But in facing up to this reality, the South will be plunged
into its inescapable dilemma-its inability to effect a means
of divorcing the states from the support of the schools.
Although it is possible that the Supreme Court, having discerned the effect of its expansion of the state action concept,
may desire to limit that expansion, it does not appear probable that it would do so in considering an attempt on the
part of a state to maintain, by indirect means, the forbidden
segregation.
The realistic effect of the scheme of supplying individual
children with tuition to the private schools is obvious-the
state will thus be channelling to the private school its means
of existence. 10 0 In condemning such a scheme, a court would
have only an easy step to make from the finding in Kerr v.
Enoch Pratt Free Library0 1 of the presence of a state instrumentality where there exists state financial support.

Action: Organization of purely private schools, with no
logically discernible state aid or support.
Attack,: (A) The parformance by the schools of a governmental function is sufficient to place them
under the sphere of state action.
(B) The affirmative action in taking the state
out of the school business is sufficient state
action.
(C) The state's failure to prohibit the discrimination practiced by the private schools and its
acquiescence in such conduct would be sufficient to constitute state action.
As has been noted, it is extremely doubtful that support
of the private schools through tax-raised funds will be eliminated. However, assuming that this improbable step would be
taken, 10 2 there remain several logical theories of attack which
100. Note that assistance in the form of providing students with
tuition has been held within the analogous prohibition of aid to sectarian schools. Williams v. Stanton Dist., supra note 95.
101. See note 76 supra.
102. The possibility exists that a Southern community would attempt
to supplant the present school taxes with purely voluntary contributions
to the private schools by taxpayers in equivalent amounts. These con-
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could be leveled against the purely private schools continuing
the practice of segregation.
(A) Performance of a governmental function. To some
extent, all of the cases which have been discussed as utilizing
the instrumentality theory of state action have involved the
performance by the alleged instrumentality of a function of a
governmental nature or pertaining to a high public purpose.
Several of these cases, however, are considered as presenting
situations in which the performance of a governmental function was the crux and only rational basis of the finding of a
state instrumentality.
The most notable of these is Terry v. Adams. 03 The primary
reached by the Court in this decision was conducted by a local
county political organization, the Jaybird Democratic Association, which had been in existence since 1889. The Jaybird
party completely regulated its own affairs and conducted its
primary two months before the regular Democratic primary.
However, the candidates nominated for county offices in the
Jaybird election had regularly entered the ensuing Democratic
primary (although there was no legal compulsion on them
to do so), and they had with few exceptions won the Democratic primary elections without opposition. As rules of conduct, the Jaybirds had apparently followed the rules prescribed by the state for the conduct of the Democratic Party
primaries.
The Court did not hesitate to find the necessary state action,
although the language used in the varied opinions, 0 4 went
far beyond the narrow confines of the present interpretation
of the decision. 0 5 Running through all the opinions in the
case, however, is at least the implied idea of the exercise of
the local party of a function of government. True, the decision revolved around the control by the Jaybird party of
the only effective choice in the series of two primaries and
the following general election. But how can it be concluded
that the exercise of such control is the equivalent of state actributors would include industrial organizations and businesses, who
presently supply the major portion of the school funds. The effectiveness of such a scheme without the compulsory influence of government
is open to doubt. And attempts by state or local governments to compel
such contributions would supply state action.
103. 345 U.S. 461 (1953). See text at notes 61 and 63, supra.
104. The eight justice finding state action split into three concurring
opinions, plus one dissent.
105. See text at and following note 134, infra. Another possible interpretation of the decision is there presented.
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tion without also embracing in such a conclusion any combination of individuals which exercises such influence as to effectively control the outcome of an election? This distinction,
which is obviously fundamental, can only be made by interpreting the decision to be that any group which adopts machinery similar to that authorized by the state or normally
used, with the state's blessing, for similar purposes, is, if
that purpose is the accomplishment of a necessary and essential function of government, an instrumentality of the state.
This result had been foreshadowed by Rice v. Elmore,10
although it was less obvious from that case because of the
party's use of the identical procedures and regulatory requirements which had only shortly before been repealed by
the state, and also because the primary involved was that
conducted by the regular Democratic Party, only one step removed from the general election.
This extensive step, to brand as state action for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment the acts of a group exercising a normal function of government, had also been foreshadowed in previous decisions of the Court. In 1944 a union,
which had been endowed as sole bargaining agent for its craft
under a federal statute, attempted to discriminate against
minority members of the craft through an agreement with
the employer. The Court held that the union must represent
all the members of the craft and struck down the discriminatory attempt, saying: "Congress has seen fit to clothe the
bargaining representative with powers comparable to those
possessed by a legislative body. .. but it has also imposed on
the representative a corresponding duty."' 1°7 Later, only a
year before it was to decide Terry v. Adams, the Court was,
presented with a similar instance of union discrimination.
The Court reiterated its previous decision, holding that bar106. 165 F. 2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948).
This conclusion had also been foreseen by legal writers, one of whom
noted the Court's emphasis in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944),.
on the degree of statutory control over the primary, but stated: "... in
fact the statutes merely recognized the public character already attainedT
through the self-development of the organizations .... ." Barnett, WHAr
Is "STATE" ACTION . . . , 24 OREGON L. REv. 227, 230 (1945). Another

writer concluded that a political party performs a vital state function

and that a realistic court could therefore ". . . extend the meaning of
state action to political parties, regardless of the absence of statutory
regulation." Note, 47 COL. L. REV. 76, 89-90 (1947).
107. Steele v. L. & N. Ry. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944). The "duty"
referred to was implied by the Court because of the status given theunion as sole bargaining agent. The statute did not affirmatively impose such a duty.
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gaining agents who enjoyed the advantages of the federal
statute must honor their trust not to invade the rights of
08
minority workers.
In 1946 the Court had also dealt with this exercise of power
of government. In Maorsk v. Alabama,'" a state court's conviction of a Jehovah's Witness for trespass upon the property
of a privately-owned town was reversed. While the Court had
an element of state action present in the action of the state
court, it did not specifically dwell upon this element and intimated that the public nature of the privately-owned premises
involved supplied the necessary state action. The Court rejected the contention that the private corporation's right to
control the streets and sidewalks of its town was coextensive
with the right of a homeowner to regulate the admission of
guests to his home, and said: "The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the
'
statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it."l o
Having established the principle that the expanding concept of state action should include the acts of private organizations exercising a governmental function, the only obstacle
to the application of this principle to cases of discrimination
by private schools which had been organized to replace public
schools (since the state-supported institutions could no longer
maintain racial separation), would be a finding that the new
institutions were exercising a function of government. It does
not appear that such a finding would entail lengthy debate.
The cases are replete with statements to the effect that
the education of youth is a "fundamental" and "indispensable"
108. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768
(1952). Three dissenting justices in this case expressed their inability
to discern the presence of state action, saying (per Justice Minton) : "I
do not understand that private parties ... may not discriminate on the
ground of race. Neither a state government nor the Federal Government may do so, but I know of no applicable federal law which says
that private parties may not." Id. at 778. See also, Hargrove v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 116 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1953); Wood v.
Randolph, 209 F. 2d 634 (8th Cir. 1954). But ef., Williams v. Yellow Cab
Co., 200 F. 2d 302 (3rd Cir. 1952).
109. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). See note 27, supra.
110. Id. at 506. The conclusion that the governmental function ex-

ercised by the private corporation was the principal thesis of the Court

is supported by the fact that a companion case, Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S.
517 (1946), similarly reversed such a conviction where the private town

involved was owned by the Federal Government. See 33 VYI.
643, 645 (1948).
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governmental function.". The Supreme Court itself spoke
of this function in its decision invalidating segregation:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school
attendance laws and the great expenditures for education
the importance of
both demonstrate our recognition of
112
education to our democratic society.
In facing this question, however, the courts would be dealing with a situation where the sovereign people of a state
had acted, through constitutional amendment, to abnegate or
amend the state's responsibility to maintain public school institutions." 3 Thus, they would have to ask-if the people of
a state wish to declare that schooling should no longer be considered a function of their government, has a court the power
to override their decision? This question may logically cause
some courts to ponder, but it would not appear to be a serious
hindrance to a declaration that the new private schools had
taken over the exercise of a governmental function.
The nature of education made it an essential of government
before the states of this nation insured it to be such by constitutional provisions. Such mandates in the state constitutions merely took cognizance of a function already essentially
of a public nature. Taking this as its precept, and having
its usual zeal to overturn all attempts to circumvent its decisions, the Supreme Court could, with apparent ease, apply
4
The sigits test of Terry v. Adams to the private schools."
111. "The power over education is an attribute of government that

cannot be legislatively extinguished. It cannot be bargained away or

fettered." Malone v. Hayden, 329 Pa. 213, 197 A. 344, 352 (1938). "It

is unquestionably the function of government to establish and maintain
public schools. Indeed the Constitution of Oregon . . .specifically commits to the legislative assembly the establishment.. ." of public schools.
Campbell v. Aldrich, 159 Or. 208, 79 P. 2d 257, 261 (1938) (the court
inferred that education is a function of government, over and above con-

stitutional mandates).
112. Brown v. Board of Education, -

U.S. -, 98 L. ed. 583, 589

(1954) ; see also, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 300, 400 (1922).

113. The elimination or amendment of the state constitution's requirement of the maintenance of a public school system is a prerequisite to
the shift to private schools.
114. One writer has predicted that Terry v. Adams may have a wide
effect in areas of schooling, transportation and the like. He said that
these public services, as much as elections, ". . . relate in some manner
to the state even without specific statutory control. Arguably, if a state
attempts to repeal its statutes relating to such services rather than bow
to an order prohibiting discriminatory segregation, the question may be

raised whether a state can so sever its connections and divest the facilities of their public nature." 32 TExAs L. REV.223, 225 (1953).
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nificant comment has already been made that the Terry decision, with its finding of state action in the exercise of a
function of government, "serves as a useful forewarning that
if segregation in the public schools is invalidated, the impact
of this invalidation may not be avoided by turning the schools
over to private organizations."" i5
(B) State's positive action in removing its control of public
schooling. Another quite possible theory of attack, in the event
that purely private schools could be established, is the view
that the affirmative action of a state in actively taking the
state out of the school business supplies the necessary state
action to make the subsequent discrimination by the private
schools subject to the Fourteenth Amendment.
This theory was apparently first employed, in the cases involving racial discrimination, in Elmore v. Rice'" where South
Carolina had attempted, by repeal of all statutes regulating or
in any way referring to the Democratic primary, to classify
the primary as a purely privately-conducted election of a private club. The argument was there made that the action of the
state in repealing all such statutes amounted to a deprivation
of the Negro's right to vote in the primary election, since
under the combined effect of the previous statutory regulation
of the primary and the Smith v. Allwright"'1 decision, the
Negroes had a Court-endowed right to vote in the primary,
and that the repeal of the primary laws, by removing the
basis of the Smith v. Allwright decision, deprived them of
this right.
The district court judge noted this contention that the
state's act, while apparently negative in form, was actually
positive in application, and termed it a novel but interesting
doctrine. 8 He declined to elaborate on it, however, and based
his decision on other grounds." 19
115. Howe, THE SUPREME COURT, 1952 TERM, 67 HARv. L. REv. 91,

105 (1953).

116. 72 F. Supp. 516 (E.D.S.C. 1947), aff'd 165 F. 2d 387 (4th Cir.

1947).
117. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).

118. 72 F. Supp. at 524.
119. Both the district court and the circuit court recognized the primary as the only effective phase of the election, and apparently treated
it as the performance by a private organization of a governmental function. See text supported by note 106, supra. Commentators on Rice v.
Elmore have insisted that the theory here discussed could have been a
logical basis for the decision. See Note, 47 COL. L. REv. 73, 86 (1947);
96 U. OF PA. L. REV. 441, 442 (1947). But cf., 28 NEB. L. REV. 154, 155
(1949), where this theory is termed untenable.
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This "novel" proposition was based principally on a decision of the Supreme Court which can be so analyzed as to
present an almost perfect analogy, 1 20 and upon an apparent
21
passing recognition of the principle in another case.'
To apply this proposition to an instance of a private school's
discriminatory act in refusing to admit a Negro, the Negro
would contend that the decision declaring segregation in the
public schools to be invalid had endowed him with the right
to attend such schools in conjunction with white students and
not to be segregated. He would then reason that the state
had created the possibility of a potential infringement upon
this right by taking itself out of the school business (since the
right would have to be recognized at a state-supported school),
and that this potential invasion of his right became actual
when the private school refused to admit him. He would thus
be relying on the premise that the removal by the state of the
protection previously afforded him by the existence of public,
state-supported schools supplied the necessary state action to
make the Fourteenth Amendment applicable in a suit against
1 22
the private school.
Although it might appear that this theory is academic because no state will remove the present public school provisions
for Negroes and thus not infringe upon their right to schooling as such, this fact would not prevent the use of this proposition in an attack on private schools which supplant the present public schools for whites and which thus continue the forbidden practice of segregation. The right involved will be
the right not to be segregated, rather than the mere right
to attend some school. The reasoning underlying this theory
120. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921). The case involved a
state statute which precluded any injunction against picketing except
such accompanied by violence whereas it was conceded that the state's
previous common law principie would have entitled the employer to an

injunction under the circumstances present (use of libelous and threatening language). The Court, considering the state court's construction of

the statute as denying the employer any remedy under the circum-

stances, held the statute to be both a denial of a property right without
due process and a denial of equal protection. Conceding that no one

has a vested interest in any particular rule of common law, the Court
pointed out that the fundamental principle of due process prevailed
over the state's legislative power, and that an arbitrary exercise of
that power, such as to "practically sanction" a wrongful invasion of
property rights and to strip the owner of remedy, was at variance with

due process. Id. at 329.
121. Senn v. Tile Layers' Union, 301 U.S. 468, 482 (1937).
122. See Hale, RIGHTS UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AND

AMENDMENTS

FIFTEENTH
AGAINST INJURIES INFLICTED BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS, 6

LAWv. GUILD REV. 627, 636 (1946) for a similar analysis of Truax v.
Corrigan, supra note 90.
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seems tenuous, but its possible use as a theory of attack on
private schools which are otherwise outside of the discernible
area of state action should be noted.
(C) State's inaction or failure to prohibit discriminatory
acts and acquiescence therein. Similar to the theory of attack
just discussed, but even broader, is the proposition that if a
state fails or refuses to exercise its available power to correct
or prohibit the discriminatory acts of apparent private groups,
it has denied the equal protection of the laws to those affected
by the discrimination. Simply stated, this theory, which would
undoubtedly be employed if purely private schools were to be
established in Southern communities, is that a state's inaction
or acquiescence is equivalent to direct state aid to the discriminating organizations, and supplies the element of state action
necessary to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment.
The view that a state can deny equal protection equally
as effectively by its failure to act as by positive action was
originally conceived during the controversy over whether the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were intended to allow
Congress to legislate to check the discriminatory acts of private individuals. Substantial evidence can be cited to show
that Congress, in construing its power to extend to the protection of Negroes from the abuses of individuals, where the
states had failed to provide such protection, also considered
the state's failure to prohibit the discrimination an affirmative denial of equal protection. 12 3 As has been noted, however,
the Supreme Court declared the sweeping enactments of Congress which reached all private discriminatory acts unconsti123. See Flack, ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, 262-263
(1908); Barnett, supra note 106, at 228 and 232; Frank & Munro, THE
ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING

OF "EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS", 50 COL.

L. REV. 131, 163-164 (1950). The latter authors concluded: "The prevail-

ing

view (in Congress at time of passage of Amendments) . .. was that
a state denied equal protection when it permitted repeated outrages
against one class in the community." Id. at 164. Among the evidence
relied on by those reaching such a conclusion are the following state-

ments of congressman: "Denying includes inaction as well as action."
CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 501 (1871). "What the state permits
by its sanction, having the power to prohibit, it does in effect itself.
... There are sins of omission as well as commission." 2 CONG. REC.,
pt. 2, 412 (1874). See 46 CoL. L. REv., n. 61, pp. 105-106, for a detailed
account of these and other congressional statements. The enactments
of Congress also evidence this intent. One of the civil rights measures,
popularly known as the Ku Klux Klan bill, provided that should the
state for any reason fail to enforce the laws, ".

.

. such facts will be

deemed a denial by the State of the equal protection of the laws." 14
STAT. 176, 177 (1866).
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tutional and restricted the scope of the Amendments to direct
124
state action.
With the bounds of the state action concept thus set, little
was heard of the inaction theory until the primary cases and
recurring attempts to circumvent the Court's decisions
prompted its revival. The interesting proposition had, however, remained an object of speculation, 1 25 and had in fact
been employed by courts in a slightly different sense and on
a less extensive level. The Supreme Court had in several cases
considered the refusal of a particular state agency to act, or its
unreasonable delay in doing so, a sufficient denial of equal
protection, apparently theorizing that the inaction or delay
enabled the state to accomplish a prohibited result.12 6 Also,
in at least one instance, a court had indicated that failure of
an individual state official to protect a person from a clear
infringement of his civil rights might be considered the equiv2
alent of direct invasion of such rights by the official.1 7
Following Smith v. Alworight and South Carolina's attempt
to circumvent the decision by repealing all statutory connections with the Democratic primary, the inaction theory began
to be prominently mentioned as a possibility for upsetting
such evasive tactics. The use of the theory in the attack on
124. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); James v. Bowman, 190

U.S. 127 (1903). See note 50, supra,and text supported thereby.

125. Borchard, THE SUPREME COURT AND PRIVATE RIGHTS, 47 YALE

L. J. 1051, 1072 (1938); Hale, FORCE AND THE STATE...

,

35 COL. L.

REV. 149, 185 (1935).
126. Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 270 U.S. 587, 591 (1925)-a longcontinued and unreasonable delay by a state board in putting an end

to confiscatory public utility rates; Lawrence v. Mississippi Tax Comm.,

286 U.S. 276, 282 (1931)-the refusal of a state court to decide a claim

of denial of equal protection was considered as effective a denial of
constitutional rights as an erroneous decision would be. See Rottschaefer,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 444 (1939).

127. In Catlette v. United States, 132 F. 2d 902 (4th Cir. 1943), there

were sufficient direct acts on the part of a state officer in subjecting
a prisoner to indignities to support his prosecution under a federal
civil rights statute (18 U.S.C. 52). The court commented, however,

that the failure of the official to protect the victim from mob violence

would also bring the case under this statute, saying: "It is true that a

denial of equal protection has hitherto been largely confined to affirma-

tive acts of discrimination. The Supreme Court, however, has already
taken the position that culpable official state inaction may also con-

stitute a denial of equal protection." Id. at 907. The cases relied on as
support for this statement were not in point, however, and the court's
comment remains unexplainable. The Supreme Court's decision of Screws

v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), which dealt with affirmative acts
of official mistreatment, again brought on renewed urging that an

official's failure to prevent such treatment would be the equivalent (i.e.,
that failure to stop a lynch mob would be a denial of equal protection).
See Cohen, THE SCREWS CASE: FEDERAL PROTECTION OF NEGRO RIGHTS,

46 COL. REV. 94, 105 (1946).
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the South Carolina scheme was accurately predicted,123 and
utilized, in declaring the
the possibility was noted, but 12not
9
circumvention to be ineffective.
The Supreme Court had not, at this time, had any occasion
to consider the applicability of this inaction proposition, either
on the lower level of the failure of an individual official to
protect an individual from discriminatory acts, or on the
higher plane of a widespread pattern of discrimination which
the state, by failing to check, tacitly acquiesced in. And in its
1948 decision of Shelley v. Kraemer,130 where a facet of the
inaction theory could logically have been employed, the Court's

language and the basis of its decision were sufficient to indicate that it did not see the necessity of adding inaction to the
3
already expanded concept of state action.' '

In actual effect, however, the Shelley decision enhanced the
possibility that the inaction theory might in fact be the basis
of some future decision. Considering the extensive implications of Shelley v. Kraemner, long-standing proponents of inaction urged it as a possible stopping point to logical exten32
sions of the Shelley principle.

The continued insistence that a state denied equal protection
when, in the face of actual discrimination, it failed to exercise

available power to correct and prohibit the acts,

33

culminated

in the apparent recognition of the principle and reliance upon

it by some members of the Supreme Court in the far-reach128. Note, 47 COL. L. REV. 76, 87 (1947). This writer concluded: "It
is not unlikely that where . . . the state inaction can be viewed as part
of a comprehensive plan to disenfranchise the Negro, the Supreme Court
will not hesitate to apply the appellation of 'state action' to what might
be regarded as state inaction." Id. at 87-88.
129. Elmore v. Rice, 72 F. Supp. 516, 524 (E.D.S.C. 1947). Conflicting views were expressed as to the applicability of the inaction theory
to the case. Compare 96 U. OF PA. L. REv. 441, 442 (1947) with 28
NEB. L. REV. 154, 155 (1949).
130. 334 U.S. 1.
131. A limited application of the theory could have been made in the
Shelley case, in view of the existence of a marked pattern of discrimination by means of private restrictive covenants in the state involved. See
Huber, REVOLUTION IN PRIVATE LAw, 6 S. C. LAw Q. 8, 30 (1953). But
the Court stated: "These are not cases, as has been suggested, in which
the States have merely abstained from action, leaving private individuals
free to impose such discrimination as they see fit." 334 U.S. 1, 19. The
Court proceeded to find the necessary state action in the sanction and
enforcement by the state court of the private agreement.
132. See Hyman, SEGREGATION AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, 4
VAND. L. REV. 555, 568-569 (1951). This author pointed out the logical
implication of Shelley as reaching any state sanction of private discrimination, and suggested the adoption of the inaction concept, in the limited
sense of its application to a state's refusal to prohibit the discriminatory
acts of places of public resort.
133. See Barnett, supra note 106, at 232-233; Note, 96 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 402, 412 (1948).
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ing Terry v. Adams decision. 13 4 As has already been pointed
out, no clear basis for the Terry decision can be gleaned from
its three concurring majority opinions; but the more rational
explanation of the decision is apparently that the exercise by
the political party involved of a governmental function brings
it within the sphere of state action. 133 However, one of the
opinions written in the Terry case, that of Justice Black (concurred in by Douglas and Burton), and certain language used
by Justice Frankfurter in his separate opinion, reveal definite
reliance upon the principle of the state's permissive conduct
or acquiescence as supplying the necessary state action.
Justice Black, pointing out that the primary involved, because of its exclusion of Negroes, was "precisely the kind of
election that the Fifteenth Amendment seeks to prevent,"
wrote:
For a state to permit such a duplication of its election
processes is to permit a flagrant abuse of those processes
to defeat the purposes of the Fifteenth Amendment....
It violates the Fifteenth Amendment for a state, by such
circumvention, to permit within its borders the use of any
device that produces an equivalent of the prohibited election. 30
Justice Black presented no other basis for his three-judge
opinion, other than that the Jaybird primary was an integral
part, and the only effective part, of the elective process.'3 7
Justice Frankfurter, for his finding of state action in the
Jaybird party's exclusion of Negroes, relied upon an assumed
participation by county election officials in the conduct of the
primary, holding that such officials could not divest themselves
of their state-endowed trust to abide by existing legal principles even if they had not acted in their official capacities. 38
134. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
135. See text supported by and following note 103, supra. 'The most
concurred-in opinion in the Terry case, that of Justice Clark (joined by
three others), comes closest to placing the decision squarely upon the
governmental function theory. 345 U.S. 461, 477.
136. 345 U.S. 461, 469. Emphasis supplied.
137. A commentator already quoted on Terry v. Adams concluded: "It
seems that Justice Black has taken the extraordinary position that mere
failure to suppress a practice not even unlawful under state law is itself
state action-at least if the practice involves the electoral process."
Howe, supra note 115, at 105. Emphasis supplied.
138. 345 U.S. 461, 475-476. Howe said of Frankfurter's opinion: ...
equally unprecedented in holding that participation by state officials not
purporting to carry out their official duties is state activity; moreover,
there is no evidence that state officials did participate in the Jaybird
election." Howe, supra note 115, at 105. Emphasis supplied.
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Admitting that the Court was faced with a "border-line" situation and that the stipulated evidence showed a total lack of
formal state action, Justice Frankfurter proceeded, however,
to state what may justly be considered a liberal definition of
the requirement:
This phrase (state action) gives rise to a falge direction
in that it implies some impressive machinery or deliberative conduct normally associated with what orators call
a sovereign state. The vital requirementis state responsibility-that somewhere, somehow, to some extent, there
be an infusion of conduct by officials, panoplied with
State power, into any scheme by which colored citizens
are denied voting rights merely because they are colored.

18 9

Noting what he considered to be the "participation and acquiescence" of state authorities in the invalid election, Justice
Frankfurter concluded: "The evil here is that the State,
through the action and abdication of those whom it has clothed
with authority, has permitted white voters to go through a
procedure which predetermines the legally devised pri0

mary."14

Although Justice Frankfurter confined his holding to his
assumption of the participation of local election officials, his
ktress upon acquiescence and permissive conduct can only be
interpreted as lending support to the inaction theory, at least
on the lower level of the theory-that the inaction or permissive conduct of particular state officials in the face of discriminatory acts is sufficient to constitute the necessary state
action. However, Justice Black's opinion and the language
quoted therefrom would seem to go even further and can fairly
be interpreted as a statement of the inaction theory in its
broadest concept-that the failure of a state to check a pattern
allowance of such
of existing discrimination or its permissive
4
is equivalent to direct state action.' '
139. 345 U.S. 461, 473. Emphasis supplied.

Justice Frankfurter's

statement of the requisite is even more striking when compared with his

previous more-restricted concept of state action.

See his concurring

opinion in Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 13 (1943), and the dissent
in which he joined in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 140 (1945).

140. 345 U.S. 461, 477. Emphasis supplied.
141. The lone dissenter in the Terry case, Justice Minton, similarly
analysed the opinions, pointed out that he could find no "iota" of state
action present, and asked: "Does such failure of the state to act to
prevent individuals from doing what they have the right as individuals
to do (join in concerted action for political purposes) amount to state
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Whether, in their zeal to end all vestiges of discrimination
in Negro suffrage, 142 the members of the Court realized and
considered the effect of their language is open to doubt. But
just as with the logical implications of Shelley v. Kraemer,
the opinions in Terry v. Adams stand as delivered. On its face,
the language used would seem to have completed the cycle of
the state inaction or acquiescence concept from its apparent
repudiation in the Civil Rights Cases to its tacit recognition
and limited application. Because this inaction theory comes
so very close to implying that every act of a private individual
14 3
is state action if the state does not actively forbid it,
the
Court may very well, if forced to consider its direct utilization,
disavow the language of the Terry case and validly rationalize
the decision on other grounds. However, the use of the theory,
in the event purely private "white schools" attempt to continue
segregation, is almost certain.

Such are the direct attacks which can be brought, either
separately or in combined form, against private schools which
are established without state aid in any form or manner. Two
of these theories, finding state action in the exercise by the
schools of a governmental function or in the state's failure to
prohibit their discriminatory acts, have both been recognized
to such an extent that they stand ready for use should the
Court desire to implement them against the evasive attempt
to continue separate schools.
Whether the Court would desire to do so is an indeterminable question. Any case presenting such theories alone would
involve questions of constitutional law, public policy and sociological import perhaps even more immense than those faced
by the Court in considering the constitutionality of segregation
per se.
action? I venture the opinion it does not." Id. at 489. At least one
commentator has concluded that the only meaning of the Terry case is
the use of the inaction theory. 33 NEB. L. Ra-. 96 (1953).
142. The temper of at least two members of the Court toward remain-

ing evidences of disenfranchisement of Negroes is strikingly indicated

by the dissent of Justices Douglas and Black from the Court's refusal

to consider an attack upon Georgia's county-unit electoral system. South

v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950). The two justices cited the county-unit
system as the "last loophole" around the primary decisions. Id. at 278.
143. See Note, 96 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 402, 412 (1948); Hyman, supra
note 132, at 570.
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Action: A state court's enforcement or sanction of the discriminatory act of a private school.
principle of Shelley v. Kraemersupplies, in the
The
Attack:
act of the state court, the necessary state action.
To complete a discussion of the varying applicability of the
state action concept to the private school proposals and possibilities, there remains one extensive facet of the concept which,
although it is almost as far-reaching in consequences as the
previously discussed inaction theory, has, unlike that theory,
been definitely and unequivocally established.
This is the doctrine of Shelley v. Kraemer,144 where the
Court construed a state court's enforcement of a private discriminatory agreement (restrictive covenant) as supplying
the necessary state action to make the Fourteenth Amendment
applicable. This holding was subsequently more firmly settled
by Barrows v. Jackson,145 finding similar "state sanction" in
the act of a state court in allowing the recovery of damages
for the breach of such a covenant.
The rationale of these decisions could logically be applied
to the instance of state court enforcement of any private discriminatory acts which infringe upon established rights. To
a private school's denial of admission to a Negro because of
his race, the theory the cases present could be used whether
there were present direct or indirect state support of the school
or whether there were no discernible features of state aid.
This theory could further be employed in the instance of state
court sanction of apparent discriminatory acts arising from
the operation of any of the evasive measures which may be
undertaken by the Southern states. Thus, the proposition here
discussed applies equally to all plans of action which are noted.
The theory is discussed at this point simply to present a compact view of the impact of the state action concept upon the
circumvention plans.
The implications arising from the Shelley decision and its
subsequent enhancement in the Barrows case have already
been discussed.' 46 Their method of utilization in an attack on
the private school plans is evident. From the holding in these
cases that a state court's enforcement of a restrictive covenant
in equity, or the allowance of the use of such covenant as a
144. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).

145. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).

146. See notes 70, 71 and 72, supra,and text supported thereby.
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basis for the recovery of damages, supplies the necessary element of state action, it logically follows that a similar state
court enforcement or sanction of a private school's refusal to
admit a Negro, despite the Negro's right not to be denied admission solely on the basis of his race or color, would also be
deemed state action for the purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Even though the initial discriminatory act may
not have been sufficient to support an invocation of the
Amendment, being the act of a purely private organization
without any element of state aid sufficient to make it a state
instrumentality, the entrance of the state court in a supporting role would supply the requisite element of state action. 147
Considering this premise, a state court of one of the Southern states, if faced with a request for an injunction to restrain an alleged discriminatory refusal of a private school
to admit a Negro, would obviously be plunged into a complex
dilemma. If the court should grant the requested relief, it
would be deciding that even the discriminatory act of a private
person or organization is a denial of equal protection, disregarding the state action requirement of the Fourteenth
Amendment. However, if the court should refuse the relief
and dismiss the action, it would be sanctioning the private act
and thus the Shelley principle would become applicable, adding
the state court sanction to the discriminatory act to supply
the necessary state action.1 48 Certainly, it would seem to be
true that this apparent implication of the Shelley case makes
the following conclusion of one commentator seem realistic:
"Whether an action will remain private, and not through a
judicial suit become that of the state, seems to depend pri49
marily on the aggrieved party.'
Because of the clear dilemma which would face a state court
in this situation, however, and because of the apparent coercion which would be placed upon such a court to include
purely private action within the reach of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the possibility remains that the Supreme Court
may not wish to extend the principle of Shelley v. Kraemer
and Ba'rrows v. Jackson beyond the confines of the actual decisions. The Court could obviously limit the theory of the
147. For a thorough discussion of the apparent effect of the Shelley

principle upon the state instrumentality theory of state action, see Huber,
supra note 131, at 25-28. This author concluded: "Substantively, the
results would now seem to be the same, whether we have an instrumentality theory or not." Id. at 28.
148. Id. at 27.
149. Id. at 29.
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two cases to the peculiar fact situation involved in both cases
-state court action on restrictive covenants, or, since the
actual result of the two cases was to prevent a state court
from coercing a private individual to discriminate, 1 50 the Court
could refuse to apply the theory to instances where the private
person involved actually desired to discriminate. 151
Whether the Court would so limit the doctrine of the Shelley
cise can only be a matter of conjecture, but it seems doubtful
that any hesitancy in applying the doctrine would be encountered should the acts of the state court in denying relief to
Negroes excluded from the private schools be viewed as part
of a systematic scheme of maintaining the invalidated separate
schools.
That the Court will be urged to so utilize the doctrine should
not be doubted.
(2) INDIVIDuAL ASSIGNMENT

AND TRANSFER PLANS

If some of the foregoing theories of attack on the private
school plans seem more or less obvious, the theory which would
be used against the individual assignment and the individual
transfer proposals appears to be even more obvious.
This theory, which would undoubtedly be employed if a
state official acted under either of such plans to assign (or
transfer) a Negro child to an all-colored school after the child
had indicated his preference to attend an integrated school,
would simply allege that the statute creating the power to so
assign or transfer, while not discriminatory in its terms, enabled the official acting under such statute to make the assignments or transfers arbitrarily on the basis of race or
color, and that they had in fact been made on that arbitrary
basis.
This theory is termed obvious, and its success apparent, because such assignment or transfer proposals contain no element of tact or subtleness. The enumeration in statutes creating these plans of the factors which school officials are to
consider in making the assignments or transfers (general
welfare, etc.) will be a poor disguise for the actual basis upon
which the officials act. After such plans have been implemented and a number of assignments or transfers made, the
pattern of continued separation on the basis of race would be
150. Hyman, supra, note 132, at 569.
151. See Huber, supra note 131, at 31 for a statement of this possibility.
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too evident for any court to fail to recognize such schemes
as an open subterfuge.
It is, of course, true that school officials and boards of education are vested with a broad power of discretion in assigning
pupils to various -schools within the district concerned, such
discretion being essential to the orderly administration of
the school systems. 1 2 The fact that a certain school may be
more conveniently located for a pupil or preferred by him
is not determinative of his right to attend that school. 153 The
exercise of this power of discretion in making assignments of
children to school has normally been qualified only by the
condition that it be reasonable and have been done in good
faith for the promotion of the best interests of the educational system. To these qualifications on their assignment
power, however, Southern school administrators must now
evidently add another-that the assignment must not have
been made on the basis of race or color. And continued separation of the races can manifestly no longer be considered a
furtherance of the best interests of the schools and students.
Even in the earliest cases arising under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court found state action in the discriminatory enforcement by state officials of a statute which was
not discriminatory in its terms.5 4 And the Court has never
hesitated to look behind the terms and specifications of a
statute to see if in fact arbitrary discrimination had been
practiced.
A case arising as a result of attempts to circumvent the
Court's "white primary" decision can again be used as illustrative. To exclude Negro voters, the Alabama Democrats
added to their already existing qualification for registration,
that the applicant be able to read and write any article of the
United States Constitution, the provision that such applicant
should also be able to "understand and explain" the same. The
Court testing this addition stressed its impractical nature and
the vast discretion which it gave the registration examiners
(since there were many varying explanations of numerous articles of the Constitution, the examiners could conclude that
the applicant had not given a correct construction) and concluded that the boards of registrars administering this provision had, in fact, power to establish two classes, those whom
152. Hamilton, THB LAW AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 46

(1941).

153. Ibid.
154. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879); Ex parte Virginia, 100
U.S. 339 (1879). See Rottschaefer, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 441 (1939).
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protection.'
It should not be questioned that similar statistics would be
brought forth to show that the individual assignment or transfer powers had been arbitrarily used to enforce a continued
separation of the races. The Court has said that the Amendments nullify "sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes
of discrimination. .... ,,157 The individual assignment and
transfer proposals would not seem to have even the legal
standing of "sophistication."

(3) GERRYMANDERING OR REARRANGEMENT OF SCHOOL
DISTRICTS

Attempts to maintain more or less separate school systems
by rearranging the borders of present school districts would
again result in an obvious theory of attack-that as a subterfuge, such a gerrymandering scheme would be an attempt
to continue the prohibited segregation.
It is conceded that state legislatures have broad power to
create, alter or destroy school districts, or endow a subordinate agency with power to do so, as it may deem to be in the
best educational interests of the state.'-5 In considering the
exercise of such power, the courts have taken cognizance of
both educational and economic problems involved in the particular rearrangement, and have only imposed the restraint
that the exercise of the power be not arbitrary or unreason59
able.1
However, just as with its power to allow individual assignments of students to schools, any legislature must now add a
new condition-that the power be not exercised so as to infringe upon the established right of a Negro student not to
be arbitrarily separated from children of other races. With
155. Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872, 878 (S.D. Ala. 1949), aff'd 336
U.S. 933 (1949).
156. Ibid.
157. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1938).

158. Hamilton, op. cit. supra note 123, at 527-528; Phelps v. Witt, 304
Ky. 473, 201 S.W. 2d 4 (1947); Powers v. State Educational Finance
Comm., 222 S.C. 433, 73 S.E. 2d 456 (1952).
159. Hamilton, op. cit. supra note 152, at 533.
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this addition, any alteration of school district borders, even
though such might not mention a division along racial lines,
would be immediately subject to suspicion.
Attempts to require separation of the races in residential
areas by statutory mandate were early struck down as an
undue interference by the state with property rights. 16 0 The
cases establishing this principle would be utilized in the attack on any gerrymandering scheme, shifting the reliance in
such cases upon property rights to the now settled right of
Negro children to attend any school (without refusal because
of color) for which they may be qualified and properly situated in regard to residential proximity. The attacks upon a
re-zoning device would thus rest upon the simple analogy of
such an attempt to the similar zoning of residential areas on
the basis of race. Even if such a school district rearrangement did not specifically proceed upon racial lines, it would
not be difficult to show that it had in fact created such a division.
The invalidation of a gerrymandering plan might also be
hastened by the effect of several decisions holding Negro
school students to have been denied equal protection because
they were required to travel further to get to their schools than
white children of the same area. 10 1 These cases, concerning
inter-county schools where the counties involved had too few
Negroes to afford a separate school in each, could be relied
on as showing that if, under a district re-zoning scheme, the
result was to require Negro children in some parts of the new
district to travel further than white children in similar districts, such would be sufficient alone to invalidate the scheme.
Although in many Southern communities and cities, there
already exists a distinct division of the residential areas of
the two races, even such previously existing groupings into
separate school attendance areas would also become subject
to scrutiny by new attempts to arrange geographically fantastic school zones in areas, principally rural, where the two
races are intermingled. Perhaps this will be one of the more
unfortunate consequences of the segregation decision for the
160. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). Reiterated in: Harmon

v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668 (1927); City of Richmond v. Deans, 281 U.S.
704 (1939).
161. Corbin v. County School Board of Pulaski County, 177
(4th Cir. 1949) -inconvenience and loss of time in going to
school pointed to as one of factors contributing to inequality;
School Board of Arlington County, 182 F. 2d 531 (4th Cir.

direct holding that such factors constituted inequality.
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South, that all of her unpremeditated racial distinctions will
likely be caught in the maelstrom of the attacks upon the
varied circumvention measures.
(4) TRI-SCHOOL PLAN
Proposals to establish a three-pronged school system, in
which one school would be open on an integrated basis to all
comers and the other two only to Negro and white children,
respectively, seem to be both impractical and legally illogical.
Although the operation of such a plan would, of course,
evidence the public sentiment of a community, and perhaps
result in a virtual continuation of the same school systems
now existing, the ban upon Negro admission to even one part
of the system would seem to render it susceptible to successful attack. The refusal of the "white" school section of this
system to admit Negroes is exactly the type of refusal which
the Court's decision has prohibited. The state, having maintained the discriminating "white" school, would have accomplished the same act which the Courthas ruled that it cannot
do by direct statutory mandate, and this would be especially
evident if, as is probable, few or no white children elected
to attend the integrated division of the system.
Any court might be reluctant to upset such an optional
school attendance plan when the white citizenry of a community would have indicated overwhelmingly that they did
not desire an integrated school system, but, if subjected to
attack, such a court would seem to have little choice but to
invalidate the refusal of a "white" school directly maintained
by the state to admit an otherwise qualified Negro child.
(5)

EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER

Among the obvious theories of attack upon the circumvention proposals is that which would be leveled against an attempt to exercise state police power to continue separate school
systems.
The Supreme Court long ago overruled the use of police
power in an almost identical situation-a municipal ordinance
zoning residential areas on the basis of race. 1 2 The Court's
characterization of that ordinance shows its similarity to the
present proposal:
162. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
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This drastic measure is sought to be justified under
the authority of the state in the exercise of the police
power. It is said such legislation tends to promote the
public peace by preventing racial conflicts; that it tends
to maintain racial purity ....111
While the Court has conceded the broad power of the state
to exercise its police power, by reasonable means, for the
promotion of the public health, safety and general welfare, 1 4 it
has also carefully pointed out, and definitely ruled, that such
power does not justify laws which conflict with the Federal
Constitution, including the Fourteenth Amendment. 165 In so
ruling in Buchanan v. Warley, the Court acknowledged the
difficult problems arising because of racial hostility and conflicts, but concluded that the solution of such problems "...
cannot be promoted by depriving citizens of their constitutional rights and privileges."' 6
Remembering that the Court has ruled that the Fourteenth
Amendment, as a part of the supreme law of the land, endows
Negro children with the right not to be segregated for the
purpose of schooling because of their race, and recognizing
that phrases such as health and welfare are but a poor disguise
for the factor of race, should it be doubted that the Court
would simply reiterate the language of the Buchanan opinion
in declaring similar police power enactments to be unconstitutional.

(6) LESS PROBABLE THEORIES
The foregoing theories of attack are those which appear
more likely to be utilized. There are, however, several other
theories which should be noted and considered by those who
may formulate any of the particular evasive measures.
(A) If a state should attempt to support, with tax-raised
funds, a school purporting to be private or if it should provide
individual children with funds to be used for their individual
education, the charge would be possible that such amounted
to an unconstitutional use of public funds for a private pur163. Id. at 73-74.

164. Id. at 74; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).

165. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 74.
166. Id. at 80-81. The Court added, in the Buchanan opinion: "It is
urged that this proposed segregation will promote the public peace by
preventing race conflicts. Desirable as this is, and important as is the
preservation of the public peace, this aim cannot be accomplished by
laws or ordinances which deny rights created or protected by the Federal Constitution."
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pose and a deprivation of the property of either a white or
16 7
Negro taxpayer without due process of law.
In considering this possible theory of attack, however, it
must be remembered that the already-outlined plans for a shift
of the white school systems to private groups are based upon a
constitutional provision such as that proposed in Georgia and
Mississippi-that the state may lawfully provide individual
children with funds to be used for their individual education.
Any Southern state undertaking an extensive transition of its
school systems to a private base would undoubtedly, or certainly should, preface the transition with such a constitutional
amendment. Thus, if the people of a state, the repository of its
sovereign power, should so direct that the use of state funds in
such a manner should be considered a use for a public purpose, it would be difficult for any court to overrule that direction and condemn such use of state funds as having been
for private purposes.
If a state should fail, however, to have such a constitutional
provision as a base for its support of private schools, there is
some slight, but outweighed, precedent that the provision of
funds to private schools or to individual children could be
challenged on this ground of misuse of public funds. Attacks
upon the provision of state aid to sectarian schools have utilized this theory, but only two of these cases (both from the
same state) employed the theory in striking down the state
support as unconstitutional.1 68 In four other similar cases, the
courts have declined to rule that the state aid involved was
unconstitutional on this ground.6 9
The possibility exists, therefore, that state aid to private
schools, either directly or indirectly through the grant of tuition funds to individual children, could be challenged as the
use of taxation to support a private cause. Considering the
sentiment of American society that education of children is a
public function of the highest order, however, the success of
such an attack is open to doubt.
(B) If a state, in shifting its white school systems to private
institutions, should thereby completely disrupt the previously
167. See Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655 (1874), and Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158 (1896), for the

development of this principle.
168. Mitchell v. Consolidated School District, 17 Wash. 2d 61, 135 P.
2d 79 (1943); Visser v. Nooksack Valley School District, 33 Wash. 2d
699, 207 P. 2d 198 (1949).
169. See Annotation, 168 A.L.R. 1434.

The cases so holding include

Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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existing public school system and terminate all features of
that system, one of the terminated features would be a teachers' tenure system which a state may have instituted. In
such event, a white teacher whose contract with the state
under the tenure system had been impaired, could contend
that this had amounted to an unconstitutional impairment of
her contract. This contention has been upheld by the Supreme
Court, in a case where the state legislature repealed the
70
teacher tenure law.
A similar attack could also be brought by a Negro teacher
whose status might be similarly affected, but, as has been
consistently pointed out, it is highly improbable that any
Southern state attempting to evade the school decision would
disrupt the presently existing Negro school systems.
CONCLUSION
The South's attempts to circumvent the school decision seem
doomed to legal failure. The Court has ample theories to utilize in avoiding all circumvention proposals-ranging from the
relatively simple state instrumentality concept to the all-permeating doctrine of Shelley v. Kraemer.
The only hope for success of any of these measures would
seem to rest in a showing of a concerted desire on the part of
the white citizenry of a community that, even in the absence
of a coercive mandate from the state government, they did
not wish to undergo integration in their schools. The best
apparent means of making this desire clearly evident would
seem to lie in the tri-school plan or perhaps in a combination
of this plan with the grant of education funds to individual
children. 171 Under this plan, an optional attendance program
170. Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 113 A.L.R. 1482
(1938). See also Hamilton, THE LAW AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 25 (1941).
171. For example, a central integrated school could be established and
opened to children of both races. But to all children who desired not
to attend this school, the state could provide a sum to pay their tuition
to private schools. These schools would presumably be former public
schools taken over by local private groups. Under this device, the state
would be technically complying with the spirit of the Court's decision.
In addition, this combination plan has an advantage over the basic trischool proposal in that the Court, to invalidate the refusal of a white
private school to admit a Negro, would first have to overcome the
hurdle of a finding of the presence of state action in the state's indirect
support of the private school through the provision of tuition funds. It
is, of course, true that there would be serious practical difficulties involved in putting this plan into actual operation in any given community. For example, which of the present schools are to be integrated
and which are to be converted to private groups? Must the integrated
school, even though its attendance be small, have equal facilities, etc.?
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would be offered white parents. They could either send their
children to an integrated school or to a separate school enrolling only white pupils. If these parents should elect overwhelmingly to send their children to the separate school, this
indication on their part that they wished to continue separate
172
schools even without the aid of the state's coercive power
would undoubtedly be an inducement to any court construing
an attack on this device to overlook the element of state action
present in the state's direct or indirect maintenance of the
separate white school which refused to admit Negroes.
However, when one recalls the basis of the South's present
crisis-the decision invalidating segregation, the force and
strength of that decision, and the fact that in declaring constitutional provisions requiring segregation to be invalid the
Court, in effect, overruled similar expressions of desire on
the part of the people of Southern states, then there is little
cause for optimism as to the success of another showing of the
same desire. Past experience indicates that the Court, in viewing the various evasive steps, will undoubtedly think as lawyers and reason in strictly legal terms. While the Court may
have used principles of psychology and sociology to declare
segregation invalid, there is little reason to think that it would
give serious thought to the psychological advantages inherent
in allowing the Southern populace to retain their separate
schools, at least for a time, or that it would consider sociological factors demanding such retention.
Despite their apparent legal futility, however, the evasive
tactics may nevertheless serve a realistic purpose. If, by delayingthe full application of the decision, time is thus gained
for the South's people to absorb its shock and measure its effects, the evasion will have been worthwhile.
The more militant of the Negro leaders will undoubtedly
press for full recognition of their newly-won right. The tenor
and quantity of their demands are admittedly unpredictable.
172. The tri-school plan, or its combination with the provision of tuition
funds to individual children, are the only plans which offer white
parents and children an opportunity to express their wishes before
receiving any state assistance to aid them in the accomplishment of

that desire. All of the other plans are based on the exercise of the
coercive power of government to maintain separate schools. This is evident in the use of state police power, in the individual assignment plan
and in the proposal to gerrymander school attendance areas. And under
the private school plans, if the state should simply discontinue its public

schools for white children and offer to send them to private schools,

without having in advance consulted the children or their parents or
without giving them any choice, then compulsion on the part of the

state would also be clear.
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It seems inconceivable, however, that they will demand, within
the next few years, anything approaching a complete reshuffling of the South's school children.
If the integration into white schools within the next few
years of even a relatively few Negroes would, in fact, cause
the temper of the South's more ardent racial separatists to
explode, then the evasive measures may be the best means
of providing time for such extremists to accept the apparent
inevitable.
The proponents of the circumvention proposals could well
afford, however, to measure the probabilities existing before
acting hastily and irrevocably. Time has already been gained
since the school cases were first filed. Additional time has
been wisely granted by the Court before it will attempt to make
its decrees final. The effects of the decision have been measured by the South's people. Is it possible that they would be
willing to admit Negroes in the scattered instances where admission would be demanded? This question should at least be
pondered and its answer measured against the apparent futility of the evasive proposals and their only profit as delaying
steps.
Perhaps common sense compromise between the more militant groups, a tactic not hitherto used in the South's racial
conflicts, would be the best approach in this time of crisis.
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